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BENNIS V. MICHIGAN: FORFEITING THE
FAMILY CAR UNDER PUBLIC NUISANCE
LAWS
Matthew A. Martel
For centuries, governments have seized and sold private property asso-
ciated with criminal activities as a method to punish, deter, and remedy
criminal acts.1 Many property owners have argued that these forfeitures
unfairly harm their property rights and are unconstitutional under the
2Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Historically,
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1. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611-22 (1993) (reviewing the origins of
American civil forfeiture laws serving punitive, deterrent, remedial, and compensatory
goals since the late eighteenth century); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 681 (1974) (explaining that inanimate objects connected with criminal activity
have been forfeited to the government since biblical times); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures
and Penalties § 1 (1968) (summarizing the government forfeiture objectives as deterrence
and punishment); HENRY J. HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR
PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE? 17-27 (1995) (surveying the history of civil forfeiture
from its biblical origins to modern federal asset forfeiture laws); Donald J. Boudreaux &
A.C. Pritchard, Innocence Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition, 61 MO. L.
REV. 593, 600-14 (1996) (surveying the Anglo-American civil forfeiture traditions which
utilized property seizures to sanction criminal wrongdoing, and to compensate dispos-
sessed owners for their losses); Christine Meyer, Student Article, Zero Tolerance for For-
feiture: A Call for Reform of Civil Forfeiture Law, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 853, 866 (1990) (discussing the development of the remedial and punitive aspects of
civil forfeiture laws); Shannon T. Noya, Comment, Hoisted By Their Own Petard: Adverse
Inferences in Civil Forfeiture, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 497-501 (1996) (ex-
plaining that civil forfeiture punishes offenders for wrongful acts while compensating soci-
ety for the wrongdoer's violation of the social contract); Tamara R. Piety, Comment,
Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due
Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 927-47 (1991) (describing the English and American
punitive and remedial origins of forfeiture laws); Jay A. Rosenberg, Note, Constitutional
Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 390, 390-91 (1988) (explaining that
the roots of forfeiture law originated in biblical text); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-
Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 142-43 (1996) (surveying the Court's traditional ra-
tionales for confiscating innocent owners' property).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses protect an individual's property from arbitrary govern-
ment seizure. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment
provides: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." Id. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses have been found to place
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property owners who were innocent of criminal wrongdoing had the
greatest cause to challenge civil forfeitures when the government seized
their property despite the owners' lack of culpability for the criminal act
that triggered the forfeiture proceeding. Commentators often have
some basic limits on the federal government's forfeiture authority. See id. amend. V; see
also Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1780 (1996) (acknowledging that the Due
Process Clause typically guarantees owners the right to a hearing to contest property for-
feiture); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (hold-
ing that the Due Process Clause mandates that, absent exigent circumstances, the govern-
ment furnish the property owner with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
prior to the seizure of real property).
Other due process challenges to civil forfeiture statutes have met with mixed results in
the courts. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 677-79 (holding that seizure of a yacht for
purposes of forfeiture constituted an "extraordinary situation" that justified postponing
notice and opportunity for a hearing because the property is "of a sort that could be re-
moved to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation
were given"); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 466 (1926) (alleging that the state nui-
sance law wrongfully deprived an innocent owner of her car in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause); United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321,
328 (1926) (challenging the constitutionality of government seizure of illegally distilled
spirits as a penalty for failure to pay tax on those spirits); United States v. 194 Quaker
Farms Rd., 85 F.3d 985, 988-90 (2d Cir. 1996) (alleging that the civil forfeiture provisions
under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) violated an innocent owner's
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 304 (1996); United
States v. 300 Cove Road, 861 F.2d 232, 235-36 (9th Cir. 1988) (challenging, on due process
grounds, the federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 be-
cause the Act authorized confiscation without preseizure judicial review), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 954 (1989); National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Gibson, 6 F.2d 288, 291-93 (D. Kan. 1925)
(addressing a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the forfeiture of a car illegally used to
transport alcohol); State v. Hochhausler, 668 N.E.2d 457, 467 (Ohio 1996) (challenging the
constitutionality of state seizure provisions that afforded vehicle owners no hearing prior
to seizure); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF
PROPERTY 177, 190-94 (1996) (discussing how the Supreme Court has imposed Fifth
Amendment constraints on government action depriving owners of their property); JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 13.1, 13.5(a) (5th ed.
1995) (describing the role of substantive and procedural due process in protecting individ-
ual property rights). Additionally, other constitutional provisions constrain the govern-
ment's power to confiscate, seize, and forfeit property. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1141-62 (3d. ed. 1993) (discussing Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause limitations on government regulatory takings of private property); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1 to
2.1(a) (3d. ed. 1996) (describing Fourth Amendment limitations on government powers to
search and seize property associated with criminal activity); CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 71 (15th ed. 1993) (reviewing Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy limitations on the government's power to seize property in conjunction with
criminal offenses).
3. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 161-76 (describing civil forfeiture law as "inherently
hostile" to innocent owners giving rise to constitutional challenges). Many states have ig-
nored the severe impact that forfeitures can have on innocent owners and have passed
laws denying inculpable owners the right to defend against government forfeitures on the
basis that they were unaware that another party had used their property in an unlawful
manner. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.195 (Michie 1995); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 art.
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agreed with the innocent owners' constitutional criticisms, arguing that
seizing a blameless individual's property does not serve the intended
4goals of civil forfeiture. American courts steadfastly have refused to ac-
cept the innocence defense, upholding government civil forfeitures
against innocent owners for almost two centuries.5
27, § 297(m) (Michie Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3825 (West 1987). In
contrast, the federal government and some states have expressly incorporated an innocent
owner defense into their forfeiture laws. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994) (exempting
innocent parties from forfeiture provisions under the federal Comprehensive Drug Pre-
vention and Crime Control Act); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4304 (West 1989); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-33g(d) (West 1994); see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 685 (ex-
plaining that courts have upheld forfeitures of innocent owners' property for more than
one hundred years). The codification of innocent owner defenses in some states may re-
flect the impact of past constitutional challenges on modern forfeiture law. See HYDE,
supra note 1, at 61-64 (discussing the importance of an innocent owner defense to protect
individuals from unwarranted and improvident government seizures).
4. See Raymond Banoun et al., Making a Strong Argument for Civil Forfeiture Re-
form, 7 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1 (1996), available in 1996 WESTLAW 1 MONEY
LLR 1 (arguing for civil forfeiture reform because the federal government and state and
local governments no longer understand the crime-fighting goals of government seizures,
and instead, often confiscate innocent owners' property to boost department revenues);
Julie Barnes, Survey, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1267, 1273 (1996) (explaining that seiz-
ing a wholly innocent owner's property does not serve the punitive goals of civil forfei-
tures); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 142-45 (arguing
that the broad provisions of modern forfeiture statutes no longer serve narrow punitive,
remedial, and deterrent goals, and urge legislators to enact provisions that protect inno-
cent parties); Robert Reno, Victim Sideswiped By Rolling Wreck of Justice System,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1996, at A49 (describing innocent owners as victims of the govern-
ment's refusal to acknowledge constitutional limits on civil forfeitures); Noah Eliezer
Yanich, Court Abdicates Its Role Against Tyranny, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 11, 1996, at 13A
(warning that the dangerous effect of modern civil forfeiture statutes and court decisions is
to require "wives [to] betray their husbands to the police or risk losing their property").
But see George E. Ward, Bennis and the War Against Drugs, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 109,
115-16 (1996) (agreeing with the Michigan Supreme Court's decision, arguing that upon
purchase, car owners assume an obligation for certain tortious or criminal acts involving
their property "even as to... harms that the owner has no part in causing").
5. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996) (reaffirming the rationale
enunciated in The Palmyra and observing that an "unbroken line of cases holds that an
owner's interest in property may be forfeited.., even though the owner did not know that
it was to be put to [a proscribed] use"); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827)
(maintaining that an offender's culpability is irrelevant in an in rem civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding). Many of the Court's decisions simply explained that civil forfeiture is deeply
rooted in American jurisprudence as the basis for denying a property owner's complaint.
See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680 (endorsing the proposition that the historical
background of forfeiture statutes "establish[es] the principle that statutory forfeiture
schemes are not rendered unconstitutional because of their applicability to the property
interests of innocents"); Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468 (stating that it "has long been settled"
that an innocent owner's property can be seized); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210, 233 (1844) (noting that by 1844 it was already commonplace for the govern-
ment to seize pirate ships without regard to the owner's knowledge of or participation in
pirating activities). Even today, courts regularly refuse to divest the government of prop-
1997]
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The guilty property fiction is primarily responsible for the absence of a
constitutionally mandated innocent owner defense.6 Under the guilty
property fiction, the government charges the property used in connection
with criminal activity, rather than the property owner. Courts have re-
lied on this fiction to form the premise that civil forfeiture proceedings
do not threaten the property owner's constitutional rights because the
owner is not charged in the forfeiture proceeding.8 Moreover, courts
have fashioned other rationales to justify forfeiture of a blameless
owner's property, including the master-servant agency theory9 and the
doctrine of negligent entrustment."' Such tenuous justifications for up-
erty seized from an innocent owner. See, e.g., Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319, 1331
(M.D. Tenn. 1972) (denying existence of the common law innocent owner defense); In re
1979 Lincoln Continental, 405 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (denying co-
owner wife's innocent owner defense); State v. 1984 Monte Carlo SS, 521 N.W.2d 723, 724-
25 (Iowa 1994) (denying innocent owner defense to vehicle owner because she was aware
that the person to whom she entrusted the vehicle was involved in criminal activity).
6. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 19-20 (blaming the guilty property fiction for the
Court's rejection of the innocent owner defense); Noya, supra note 1, at 495 & n.9 (ex-
plaining that, under the guilty property fiction, property owners' constitutional rights are
not implicated).
7. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14. Seized property is captioned as the
defendant in both state and federal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., 507 U.S. 111 (1993); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354
(1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972)
(per curiam); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); United
States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219 (1939); United States v.
One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321 (1926); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988).
8. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14. Again, in a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing, the property is the actual defendant under the guilty property fiction. See id.; see also
36 AM. JUR., supra note 1, § 17 (noting that a conviction of a personal offender is not a
condition precedent to in rem civil forfeitures); J. William Snyder, Jr., Note, Reining in
Civil Forfeiture Law and Protecting Innocent Owners from Civil Asset Forfeiture: United
States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1345 (1994) (describing how civil
forfeiture proceedings are actually brought against the property, not the property owner).
Thus, it can be argued that the property owner's constitutional rights are not harmed by
the government's property seizure. See Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233. But see Austin
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (holding that the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Fines Clause does afford property owners some constitutional protection from unreason-
able forfeitures serving punitive ends).
9. See Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233. Under the master-servant agency theory,
"the acts of the master and crew... bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he
be innocent or guilty." Id. at 234. After reciting the guilty property fiction from The Pal-
myra, the Harmony Court offered the agency theory as an alternative basis for liability
and upheld the forfeiture of a pirate ship despite the innocent owner's pleas. See id. at
233-36.
10. See Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 404 (1878). In Dobbins's
Distillery, the Court upheld the forfeiture of a lessor's property after his lessee violated the
federal tax laws while operating a distillery on the premises. See id. The Court based its
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Bennis v. Michigan
holding civil forfeitures have weakened the United States Supreme
Court's historical consensus on the innocent owner defense." Still, re-
cent efforts to establish an innocent owner defense illustrate the Court's
continued reliance upon the guilty property fiction."
Capitalizing on the Court's continued endorsement of civil forfeitures,
local and state governments and the federal government have expanded
the reach of asset forfeiture laws in an effort to curb crime by depriving
criminals of the contraband, proceeds, and instrumentalities of their
criminal acts." Furthermore, because forfeited assets furnish local gov-
decision on the guilty property fiction, reasoning that because the owner leased the prop-
erty knowing it would be used for a distillery, "the law place[d] him on the same footing as
if he were the distiller." Id. at 399. Accordingly, the Court found the lessor's knowing en-
trustment sufficient to impose penal consequences for his lessee's actions. See id. at 404;
see also Austin, 509 U.S. at 612-13 (justifying earlier seizures of innocent owners' ships as
punishment for their negligence in entrusting the vessel to lawbreaking captains); United
States v. One Brown 1978 Mercedes Benz 450 SEL Vehicle, 657 F. Supp. 316, 319 (E.D.
Mo. 1987) (holding that the vehicle was properly forfeited where the owner entrusted it to
the wrongdoer and failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the property would not
be used in criminal activity).
11. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 692-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Justice
Douglas cited Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 365 (1808), for the proposition that
the Court should invalidate a forfeiture if the owner could not have prevented the illegal
use of the property. See Calero-Toldeo, 416 U.S. at 692; see also One 1936 Model Ford V-8
Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. at 237 (explaining that a buyer should not suffer forfeiture when a
third party wrongfully used its car because "[iut would be excessively harsh ... to say that
one dealing in entire good faith must, at his peril, first discover and then make inquiry
concerning somebody of whose existence he has no knowledge or suspicion").
12. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996) (tracing the guilty property fic-
tion as the cornerstone of the Supreme Court's continued denial of the innocent owner
defense); Austin, 509 U.S. at 615 (characterizing the Supreme Court's guilty property fic-
tion jurisprudence as "venerable"). Levy asserts that civil forfeiture's most repugnant
consequence is that, for years, courts have refused to grant innocent property owners re-
lief from civil forfeiture statutes on the basis that the property, and not the property
owner, stands accused of the crime. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 161-76. But see Boudreaux
& Pritchard, supra note 1, at 617-21 (interpreting American civil forfeiture case law to ex-
clude innocent owners of jointly held property from government seizures and arguing that
the Court has improperly broadened the guilty property fiction, contradicting its past deci-
sions).
13. See Alan Nicgorski, Comment, The Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the "War
on Drugs," and the Constitution: Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil For-
feitures, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 374, 376 (1996) (stating that the judicial and fiscal success of
federal asset forfeiture persuaded states to pass new forfeiture laws or strengthen existing
laws); David G. Savage, Wide Seizure Laws OKd by High Court, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1996, at Al (asserting that the Supreme Court's decision in Bennis sends the wrong mes-
sage to aggressive lawmakers and prosecutors that the Constitution places few limits on
their power to adopt and enforce civil forfeiture statutes). One congressman argued that
the government has used its seizure powers to wage a "war on drugs": a cause that has
served as a convenient, yet improvident, justification for the encroachment upon "the right
to own and enjoy private property." See HYDE, supra note 1, at 1. Others however, at-
tribute the emergence of progressive federal asset forfeiture laws to congressional efforts
1997]
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ernments with an additional source of revenue, local law enforcement
has a further incentive to construe forfeiture laws broadly, often ensnar-
ing innocent owners' property in the process.' 4 Today, these efforts to
increase crime control and enhance law enforcement budgets often over-
shadow an innocent owner's property interests. 5
In Bennis v. Michigan," the United States Supreme Court determined
that due process of law does not prohibit states from excluding an inno-
cent owner defense from modern civil forfeiture statutes. 7 In Bennis, the
to curb the growing drug trade. See Joy Chatman, Note, Losing the Battle, But Not the
War: The Future Use of Civil Forfeiture by Law Enforcement Agencies After Austin v.
United States, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 739, 747-49 (1994); see also Sandra Guerra, Family
Values?: The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 343, 359-64 (1996) (attributing the emergence of many broad civil forfeiture statutes
to the government's "war on drugs"). Others argue, however, that broad civil forfeiture
laws remain "on the books" because prosecutors prefer to pursue criminal defendants in
civil proceedings which require a lower burden of proof. See Marcus Lopez et al., Recent
Developments, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215,216 (1995).
14. See HYDE, supra note 1, at 8-9. Congressman Hyde argued that civil forfeiture
laws pose an inherent conflict of interest for law enforcement officials: "The more they
seize, the more they get for their own 'official use."' Id. at 9. He explained that the cur-
rent civil forfeiture system encourages police to make "'structured arrests'--undercover
drug purchases deliberately conducted in or on high-priced buildings or tracts of land that
are thereafter subject to forfeiture. See id. at 31. Congressman Hyde noted that in 1993
alone, the Department of Justice inventoried over 27,000 forfeited properties valued at
$1.9 billion. See id. at 9; see also WILLIAM FALCON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSET
FORFEITURE: GUIDE TO PRESEIZURE PLANNING 1-16 (1993) (outlining procedures for
law enforcement to maximize forfeiture results); MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE: CIVIL FORFEITURE: TRACING THE PROCEEDS OF
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING 1-10 (1988) (discussing methods by which law enforcement can
acquire necessary evidence to build strong forfeiture cases). But see George E. Ward, Sei-
zure Law Constitutionally Solid, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 20, 1996, at A8. Ward, a prosecu-
tor in Wayne County, noted that Detroit enforced the nuisance abatement statute against
vice crime violators only after Detroit citizens demanded relief from neighborhood crime.
See id. Ward also emphasized that the State of Michigan strictly adheres to the statute's
procedural requirements, forfeiting cars only for probable cause and after a trial. See id.
15. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 161-76 (discussing current constitutional infirmities
inherent in civil forfeitures of innocent owners' property due to legislative and law en-
forcement efforts).
16. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
17. See id. at 997-98. The Court distinguished an innocent owner whose vehicle was
stolen or used without consent, from an owner whose vehicle was used with the owner's
consent, but in an unconsented manner. See id. at 999. The Court did not declare, how-
ever, whether an individual whose property was stolen or used without consent actually
would be entitled to the innocent owner defense. See id.; cf. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant
Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921) ("It is the illegal use that is the material con-
sideration, it is that which works the forfeiture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being
accidental."). Instead, the Court explained that it had reserved the issue as to whether a
state could seize the property of an owner who did not consent to the property's use, and
implied that since it was reluctant to decide the above issue, then certainly, an owner who
consented to the use of her property, but not the property's unlawful use, was not entitled
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Court determined that the State of Michigan did not violate Mrs. Ben-
nis's constitutional rights when it seized her interest in the family car af-
ter her husband used the car while soliciting a prostitute.18  The State
brought an abatement action in the Wayne County Circuit Court, argu-
ing that the Bennises' car was a public nuisance. 9 The Michigan Su-
preme Court agreed with the State and ordered the abatement.20  Mrs.
to a defense. See Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 999-1000.
18. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. John Bennis was convicted of gross indecency under
Michigan law. See id. at 996 & n.1. After the criminal conviction, Michigan brought an
action under MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3801, 600.3825 (West 1987), alleging that
the car was a nuisance and asking the court to order an abatement. See id. at 996 nn.2-3.
Section 600.3801 provides in relevant part:
Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft or place used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prosti-
tutes or other disorderly persons,... is hereby declared a nuisance and the furni-
ture, fixtures and contents of any such building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place
... are also declared a nuisance, and all.., nuisances shall be enjoined and
abated as hereinafter provided, and as provided in the court rules.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West 1987). Section 600.3825 provides that:
If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action as provided in this
chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the
case, which order shall direct the removal from the building or place of all furni-
ture, fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof .... Any vehi-
cle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a nuisance within the meaning of
this chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as any furniture, fixtures
and contents as herein provided .... Upon the sale of any furniture, fixtures,
contents, vehicle, boat or aircraft as provided in this section, the officer executing
the order of the court shall, after deducting the expenses of keeping such prop-
erty and costs of such sale, pay all liens according to their priorities ... and shall
pay the balance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of the
state.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3825 (West 1987).
Generally, governments implement and enforce nuisance laws-to eliminate harms to the
public safety, health, and comfort. See C. DALLAS SANDS ET AL., 3 LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 14.03, at 14-8 (1996); see also 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY,
THOMAS EDITION § 67.02(a), at 90 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (explaining the public
and private nuisance doctrine). This Note will not engage in a detailed analysis as to
whether the Court should have approached Michigan's nuisance abatement statute under
traditional nuisance doctrines rather than under a civil forfeiture analysis. For such alter-
native analysis, see generally C. DALLAS SANDS, supra, §§ 14.03, 14.41, for a discussion of
local government regulatory powers in nuisance law and property owners' constitutional
defenses. One author suggests that Bennis was wrongfully decided under existing nui-
sance law because, traditionally, the proper remedy for a nuisance is an injunction, not sei-
zure. See Erik Grant Luna, Note, Fiction Trumps Innocence: The Bennis Court's Consti-
tutional House of Cards, 49 STAN. L. REV. 409,414-16 (1997).
19. See State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731,
732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996);
see also Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
20. See Michigan ex. rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 495
(Mich. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
1997]
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Bennis appealed to the United States Supreme Court, alleging that the
Michigan law violated innocent owners' rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause." Alternatively, Mrs. Bennis argued
that the State violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when it
confiscated the car for public use without compensating her.2  The Su-
preme Court found the guilty property fiction dispositive and denied
Mrs. Bennis relief under the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Moreover, the
Court ruled that because Michigan lawfully acquired the Bennises' car in
the forfeiture proceeding, the State was not required to reimburse Mrs.
Bennis for her ownership interest under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.
Concurring in the opinion, Justice Thomas emphasized that tradition
strongly supported the government's authority to forfeit an innocent
owner's property.25 Justice Thomas acknowledged that, although some
forfeiture laws cause harsh results and appear to violate due process limi-
tations, the Michigan law was constitutional because government forfei-
26tures existed at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, Justice Thomas concluded that Michigan's civil forfeiture
statute did not violate due process.27
21. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997-98. Specifically, Mrs. Bennis argued that the stat-
ute's failure to provide a defense for innocent owners violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause. See id.
22. See id. Mrs. Bennis argued that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as incor-
porated by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a state government from seizing prop-
erty unless it compensates the property owner. See id. A detailed discussion of Mrs. Ben-
nis's Fifth Amendment takings claim is beyond the scope of this Note.
23. See id. at 997-98. The majority opinion explained that because the Bennises' car
was the actual defendant in the civil case, Michigan could seize the vehicle after Mr. Ben-
nis violated the indecency law, without regard to Mrs. Bennis's personal culpability. See
id.
24. See id. at 1001. The Court explained that the government does not have to reim-
burse owners for property it lawfully acquires except when exercising its eminent domain
power. See id. (citing United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973)).
25. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas first discussed the balance of
interests at stake in Bennis. See id. He explained that Mrs. Bennis was concerned with her
right to retain her property unless she had committed some wrong. See id. Justice Tho-
mas then noted that Michigan's primary interest was to achieve punitive, remedial, and
deterrent law enforcement goals while assuming the lowest permissible burden of proof.
See id.
26. See id. at 1001-02 ("This case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitu-
tion does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable.").
27. See id. Justice Thomas also argued that the seizure could be rationalized under
traditional nuisance abatement concepts because, under nuisance theory, Michigan had
the power to destroy the car in the interests of public health and safety. See id. at 1002.
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In a separate concurrence, Justice Ginsburg explained that Michigan's
civil forfeiture law was a reasonable and constitutional means of deter-
ring criminal activity.28 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the trial court
acted within its remedial discretion in upholding the state forfeiture ac-
tion because Mrs. Bennis had consented to her husband's use of the ve-
hicle by way of co-ownership.29
Justices Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, dissented, ar-
guing that the Court's holding gave states unbridled authority to seize
any property associated with criminal acts.30 Justice Stevens argued that
Court precedent required Michigan to demonstrate a sufficient nexus be-
tween the Bennises' car and the underlying act of prostitution. " Fur-
thermore, Justice Stevens interpreted past forfeiture decisions as requir-
ing proof that the owner negligently entrusted the seized property to the
wrongdoer.32 Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that the Court's decision in
Austin v. United States33 limiting unreasonable civil forfeitures under the
28. See id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Michigan, in short, has not embarked
on an experiment to punish innocent third parties.").
29. See id. (opining that the trial court's discretionary remedial authority was suffi-
cient to protect innocent owners). Justice Ginsburg believed that the forfeiture scheme
was applied fairly to Mrs. Bennis because the Bennises owned another vehicle and no re-
sidual value remained after the court deducted the State's costs. See id. Like the majority
opinion, however, Justice Ginsburg noted the distinction between owners who did not
consent to the wrongdoer's use of their property and owners who consented to the wrong-
doer's use of their property, but who did not consent to the manner in which the property
was used. See id.
30. See id. at 1003-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens interpreted the major-
ity opinion as illogical because the statute at issue denied innocent individuals a defense
from overbroad government seizures. See id. For example, Justice Stevens asserted that
the majority's reasoning would justify the forfeiture of an entire airplane if the police
found one marijuana cigarette in a passenger's luggage. See id. at 1003.
31. See id. at 1005-06. Justice Stevens argued that the Court's past decisions had at-
tempted to offer innocent owners greater protection, while, at the same time, the govern-
ment was enacting and enforcing broad forfeiture laws in an effort to reach greater
amounts of private property associated with criminal activities. See id. at 1006. Justice
Stevens categorized Supreme Court civil forfeiture jurisprudence into three areas: (1) con-
traband of criminal activity subject to seizure for remedial reasons; (2) proceeds from
criminal activity forfeitable to serve restitutionary goals; and (3) property used in criminal
activities, or criminal instrumentalities, seized if the property's principle use was for crimi-
nal activity or if the property facilitated the crime. See id. at 1004-05. Under his analysis,
Justice Stevens believed the Bennises' car could not be seized because the car did not fa-
cilitate the crime and the car's principle use was not to aid in the solicitation of a prosti-
tute. See id. at 1005-06.
32. See id. at 1007 (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993)); see also
supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing negligent entrustment as an alternative
rationale for civil forfeitures).
33. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause compelled the Court to
rule in Mrs. Bennis's favor.34
In a separate dissent, Justice Kennedy warned that the Court's holding
established dangerous precedent damaging to vehicle owners' property
rights in instances where the government seized a vehicle tenuously re-
lated to criminal activity. 5 Justice Kennedy argued that because cars are
essential to the daily lives of most Americans, the Court should invoke a
rebuttable presumption that the owner negligently entrusted the car to
the wrongdoer or that the owner participated in the criminal acts trig-
gering the forfeiture. 36 Because the parties in Bennis had conceded that
Mrs. Bennis was innocent of any criminal wrongdoing and could not have
known about her husband's wrongful acts, Justice Kennedy asserted that
Michigan could not mandate forfeiture of her vehicle.37
This Note first examines the historical justifications for civil forfeiture
laws and traces the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to ac-
knowledge an innocent owner defense during the last one hundred and
seventy years. This Note then discusses the historical undercurrent on
the Court that has called for a limited innocent owner defense in statu-
tory civil forfeiture cases. This Note next analyzes the Court's reasoning
in Bennis v. Michigan, its effect on prior law that unconditionally upheld
civil forfeitures, and the decision's potential impact on the recent de-
mand for an innocent owner defense. This Note argues that Bennis
marks a departure from the growing trend of Supreme Court decisions
acknowledging that civil forfeitures may be limited by due process. This
Note asserts that Bennis will confuse lower courts and give state legisla-
tures and law enforcement the authority to invoke powerful forfeiture
laws without fear of limitation under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. Fi-
nally, this Note explores Bennis's immediate effect on lower courts and-
state governments and considers the potential impact on certain classes
of property owners.
34. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (reasoning that because the seizure of the Bennises'
car constituted a form of punishment, it should be subjected to the restraints of the Exces-
sive Fines Clause).
35. See id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy urged the Court to re-
tain the absolute liability standard established in early admiralty decisions, but asserted
that government seizure of automobiles warranted a standard that would require some
culpability on the part of the car's owner to justify the forfeiture. See id.
36. See id. (reasoning that "[the automobile] is a practical necessity in modern life for
so many people").
37. See id.
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I. LOSING THE FAMILY CAR TO PIRATES AND DRUG RUNNERS
Many states and the federal government have adopted and imple-
mented civil forfeiture laws with little judicial interference.38 While the
advent of civil forfeitures began in the context of admiralty law,3 9 the Su-
preme Court's reliance upon the guilty property fiction has withstood
constitutional challenge in non-admiralty contexts for more than one
hundred and seventy years.40 Recognizing the judiciary's reluctance to
restrain civil forfeiture authority, the states and the federal government
have continued to enact broad forfeiture laws, often authorizing the sei-
zure of property that has only a tenuous connection with the criminal ac-
41tivity triggering the seizure.
Despite the nationwide adoption of broad forfeiture statutes, the Su-
preme Court has continued to adhere to the guilty property fiction, de-
.• • 42
ferring to state court discretionary remedial powers to cure inequities.
38. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 866 (stating that courts have refused to interfere with
the ostensible remedial goals of civil forfeiture statutes, even though the laws are often
applied inequitably to punish property owners).
39. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 2 (1827).
40. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (acknowledging the Court's continued adherence to
The Palmyra, and by implication, the guilty property fiction); see also Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1993) (concluding that the American civil forfeiture tradition
is rooted in the guilty property fiction); Meyer, supra note 1, at 866-69 (discussing the
guilty property fiction's role in modern federal civil forfeiture law); George F. Will, Mrs.
Bennis's Car, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1996, at C7 (attributing the result in Bennis to The
Palmyra's concept of the guilty property fiction).
41. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 692-93 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). The Calero-Toledo Court held that a leased yacht could
be forfeited under Puerto Rico's Controlled Substances Act when the lessee was found on
board with marijuana. See id. at 690. Justice Douglas objected to the forfeiture on due
process grounds because the evidence indicated that the police may have found only a sin-
gle marijuana cigarette on board. See id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Some state
courts, however, have refused to expand forfeiture powers, exercising their discretionary
powers to strike forfeitures unless the state proves that the property owner was culpable
or that the property seized was directly connected to the criminal activity triggering the
forfeiture. See People v. Beck, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 52 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the
defendant's firearms could not be seized without proof that the guns were associated with
the crime of which the defendant was convicted).
42. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 n.27. Common law forfeiture tradition often
relied on the bench's or the jury's sympathies to mitigate harsh forfeitures. See id. How-
ever, if a particular statute does not leave the forfeiture decision to the jury, or contain an
ameliorative provision, an appellate court still may rely on the trial judge's inherent equi-
table remedial powers to cure unfair seizures. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Some federal laws have attempted to codify judicial power to mitigate harsh
forfeitures by including ameliorative provisions in statutes that permit the trial court to
restore property to innocent owners when forfeiture would be unfair. See Calero-Toledo,
416 U.S. at 689 n.27. State courts also have attempted to mitigate harsh forfeitures by re-
lying upon state constitutional due process protections. See State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104,
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By the end of the nineteenth century, the Court's consistent sanction of
absolute liability forfeiture statutes offered property owners little consti-
tutional protection, even if the owner was completely unaware that her
property was involved in a criminal act.43
A. Creating the American System of Statutory Forfeiture
1. The Guilty Property Fiction: The Palmyra
The legal concept upon which courts subsequently would base denials
of constitutional protection to innocent owners was first articulated by an
American court in 1827.44 The United States Supreme Court, in The
Palmyra,45 held that the federal government could seize a private vessel
notwithstanding the fact that the captain had not been convicted of any
46
criminal wrongdoing. In The Palmyra, the federal government seized a
vessel in the wake of piracy allegations, and subjected the vessel to a
condemnation hearing. 47 The lower courts ruled that the government
could condemn the property without a criminal conviction.4 ' The courts
determined, however, that the piracy allegations lacked evidentiary sup-
port and restored the vessel to its surety.49
The Supreme Court addressed whether the government must obtain
acriminal conviction before confiscating property used in the commission
113-14 (Alaska 1981) (holding that the Alaska Constitution required a remission or ame-
lioration opportunity for innocent owners to avoid forfeiture by proving that they lacked
knowledge of the criminal act triggering the seizure).
43. See Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 404 (1878) (upholding gov-
ernment seizure of a lessor's property when the lessee violated federal revenue laws, even
though the Court acknowledged the lessor's lack of knowledge of or consent to the les-
see's criminal acts); LEVY, supra note 2, at 57-59 (describing the prevalence of civil forfei-
ture statutes after the Civil War and in the wake of Dobbins's Distillery).
44. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
45. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
46. See id. at 14, 18. The ship's captain was charged under the Piracy Act of March 3,
1819, ch. 75, and the Piracy Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 112. See id. at 7-8. The Piracy Act
authorized the federal government to seize vessels involved in piratical acts and criminally
prosecute the ship's captain. See id.
47. See id. at 2. The circuit court found that the government vessel, the Grampus,
had probable cause to seize The Palmyra after The Palmyra rebuked the Grampus crew's
efforts to board. See id.
48. See id. at 14-15.
49. See id. at 8, 9, 15. The facts in The Palmyra do not indicate whether the ship's
owner pled an innocent owner defense; the only issue before the Court was whether the
government could confiscate the vessel before the captain was convicted of the criminal
offense triggering the confiscation. See id. at 9.
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of a crime. ° The Court explained that because civil forfeitures and
criminal proceedings are separate causes of action, a criminal conviction
was not a condition precedent to civil recovery." The Court reasoned
that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather
the offence is attached primarily to the thing."52 With respect to the suf-
ficiency of the evidence supporting the piracy charges, the Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court's factual findings and affirmed the trial
court's order restoring the vessel to its surety. 3 Thus, even though the
Court denied the government's right to forfeit The Palmyra, it articulated
the constitutional standard that would serve as the cornerstone of gov-
ernment civil forfeiture power for the next one hundred and seventy
54years.
2. Rejecting the Innocent Owner Defense
While The Palmyra Court established the legal justification underlying
American civil forfeiture law, the vessel's owners did not challenge the
forfeiture on the basis that they were innocent owners, but instead, ar-
gued that the vessel could not be forfeited unless the captain was con-
victed of using it in a crime.55 Thus, The Palmyra Court did not consider
whether the government's forfeiture power would yield to an innocent
owner's property interests." Twenty years later in Harmony v. United
States,57 the Court held that an innocent owner could not regain posses-
sion of his ship when the captain used the vessel to violate federal piracy
laws.58
Harmony, a shipowner claimed that the government wrongfully seized
his vessel because he, the owner, was unaware that the captain would use
50. See id. at 14-15.
51. See id. at 15 ("[A]nd so this Court understand[s] the law to be, that the proceed-
ing in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in
personam. ").
52. Id. at 14. This principle from The Palmyra was later termed the "guilty property
fiction." See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1993).
53. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 15-16.
54. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (citing The Palmyra with approval); see also The Su-
preme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 140 & n.63 (tracing the origin of
American civil forfeiture law to The Palmyra).
55. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14.
56. See id. at 2, 4.
57. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
58. See id. at 237. As in The Palmyra, the federal government in Harmony seized the
Malek Adhel alleging that the captain violated the Federal Piracy Act of 1819. See id. at
229. Following the seizure, the ship's owner filed a complaint demanding the ship's return.
See id.
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the ship to commit piratical acts. 9 The lower courts ruled that in in rem
civil forfeitures, the government need not prove that the owner knew the
wrongdoer would use the property in an illegal manner.0 Relying on The
Palmyra, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and held that
because civil forfeiture punished the ship, rather than the shipowner,
there was no violation of the owner's constitutional rights." The Court
also explained that the crew's illegal acts could be imputed to the
shipowner because of the nature of the owner's master-servant relation-
ship with his employees.62
If the Court's position on the innocent owner defense was unclear after
The Palmyra, Harmony offered little guidance because it, too, failed to
address squarely the rights of innocent owners.63 Instead, the Harmony
Court relied on the ship owner's unique master-servant relationship 6 to
justify imputing the employee's conduct to the owners and to mitigate
the seemingly harsh result produced by the guilty property fiction.65
In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,66 the Supreme Court again ad-
dressed the call for an innocent owner defense.6' The debate in Dob-
bins's Distillery centered around a lessee who violated federal tax laws
59. See id. at 211.
60. See id. at 230. Specifically, both lower courts condemned the brig but acquitted
the cargo, thus releasing the cargo to its rightful owners, the claimant's customers. See id.
at 229-30. By releasing the cargo to the owners, and forfeiting the ship, the lower courts
implicitly may have acknowledged a judicially created innocent owner defense, but it is
more likely that the courts found the ship guilty and the cargo innocent of the offense trig-
gering the forfeiture. See id. at 229-30.
61. See id. at 233-34, 237. The Supreme Court also agreed that the ship's cargo
should be released because the vessel was considered the "offending" property under the
Piracy Act, and therefore, the cargo was acquitted in the forfeiture action. See id. at 236-
37.
62. See id. at 234. This principle rests squarely upon the master-servant agency the-
ory. Cf Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) ("[T]he owner may be held ac-
countable for the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his property."); see also supra note
9 and accompanying text (describing the master-servant agency theory).
63. See Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233.
64. See id. at 234 ("In short, the acts of the master and crew, in cases of this sort, bind
the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly
submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of
their unlawful or wanton wrongs.").
65. See id. at 233.
66. 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
67. See id. at 397. In Dobbins's Distillery, the lessor argued that he was entitled to a
judicially created innocent owner defense because he was unaware his lessee would violate
the federal revenue laws. See id.; cf. Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 234 (avoiding determi-
nation on the shipowner's innocence defense by holding that a shipowner's agency rela-
tionship with his employees imputed responsibility from the crew's illegal acts to the
owner).
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while operating a distillery on the lessor's propertyi6 Upon discovering
the lessee's criminal conduct, the government seized the distillery, in-
cluding the lessor's land.69 In response, the lessor filed an appearance
and challenged the forfeiture.0 The circuit court determined that the
government had sufficient evidence to bring a condemnation proceeding
and upheld the government's sale of the leased property.71
Relying on The Palmyra and Harmony decisions, the Supreme Court
upheld the forfeiture in Dobbins's Distillery despite the lessor's lack of
knowledge of, or consent to, the lessee's unlawful conduct.72 Unper-
suaded by the innocent owner defense, the Court found that under The
Palmyra the government need establish only that the forfeited property
was involved in some criminal activity.73 Moreover, the Dobbins's Dis-
tillery Court analogized a property lessor to the shipowner in Harmony
and concluded that just as the shipowner was liable for the acts of the
crew under an agency theory, the lessor was liable for the lessee's crimi-
nal acts because the lessor entrusted the property to the lessee's care."
Thus, after Dobbins's Distillery, the Court could use the master-servant
relationship or negligent entrustment theory to support its use of the
guilty property fiction to forfeit an innocent owner's property.
68. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 396. The federal government prosecuted the
lessee under federal tax laws for failure to keep accurate accounting records. See id.
69. See id. at 397.
70. See id.
71. See id. On appeal, the lessor argued that the jury should have been instructed
that it must find that the lessor knew of the lessee's criminal acts in order to uphold the
forfeiture. See id.
72. See id. at 404. The Court also noted that the lessor's right to pursue a contract
suit against the lessee on the lease mitigated the effect of the Court's decision on the les-
sor. See id. This idea of alternative remedies has continued through Bennis which illus-
trates that the Court may uphold a forfeiture against an innocent owner when other relief
is available or when the trial court can deny unjust forfeitures under its equitable powers.
See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
73. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 400-01.
74. See id. at 401, 404. Though the Court's holding rested upon the guilty property
fiction, the majority noted that the lessor could be held responsible for the acts of those to
whom he entrusted the property because the lessor retained control and management over
the property while it was in the lessee's possession. See id. at 399, 404 ("If he knowingly
suffers and permits his land to be used as a site for a distillery, the law places him on the
same footing as if he were the distiller and the owner of the lot where the distillery is lo-
cated .. "); accord Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1993).
75. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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3. Owners' and Lessors' Rights After The Palmyra Line of Cases
In the wake of Dobbins's Distillery, owners and lessors were deprived
of many remedial avenues vis-a-vis government seizure powers." Begin-
ning with The Palmyra, the Supreme Court advocated use of the guilty
property fiction and held that civil forfeiture actions were not dependent
upon a wrongdoer's criminal conviction.77 Initially, The Palmyra ap-
peared limited to the narrow issue concerning the relationship between
criminal convictions and civil forfeitures."8 Shortly thereafter, however,
the Court continued to clarify the guilty property fiction by denying an
innocent owner's property claim in Harmony.9 In Harmony, however,
the Court clouded its application of the guilty property fiction to inno-
cent owners by relying upon the master-servant agency theory to uphold
the forfeiture.8" Moreover, while the Dobbins's Distillery Court upheld
the government's authority to seize a lessor's property which had been
entrusted to a lessee, it did so by relying on the negligent entrustment
theory to support its use of the guilty property fiction. ' Thus, after Dob-
bins's Distillery, it seemed unlikely that the Court would find that the in-
nocent owner defense was required constitutionally.8
76. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 400. The Court referenced Harmony v. United
States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844), for the proposition that an owner's knowledge or par-
ticipation in the criminal activity is irrelevant in civil forfeitures; the government is em-
powered to seize the property to prevent further offenses. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96
U.S. at 400.
77. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827).
78. See id. at 14.
79. See Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233-34.
80. See id. (ordering forfeiture of the owner's ship under the guilty property fiction
and master-servant agency theory despite the owner's lack of participation in or consent to
the ship captain's criminal acts).
81. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 404 ("the unlawful acts of the distiller bind the
owner of the property, in respect to the management of the same, as much as if they were
committed by the owner himself.").
82. See id. at 401. In Dobbins's Distillery, the Court listed a number of circumstances
in which the government could forfeit an innocent owner's property, including smuggling,
violations of revenue laws, and embargo and non-intercourse acts. See id. Consequently,
after Dobbins's Distillery, the Court may have viewed an owner's legal responsibility for
his property in terms of absolute, strict, or vicarious liability. See Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993). Alternatively, Dobbins's Distillery indicates that the Court sus-
pected the lessor negligently entrusted the property to the lessee because he knew the les-
see was operating a distillery on his land and failed to take reasonable steps to insure that
the lessee followed the law, even though the lessor had powers of management and con-
trol over the property. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 404.
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B. A Glimmer of Hope for the Innocent Owner Defense
1. A Sympathetic Tone But a Strong Precedential Voice
In The Palmyra and its progeny, the Court unconditionally upheld the
forfeiture of property associated with criminal activities, and remained
unsympathetic to the rights of innocent owners."' At times, the Court
justified its absolute liability forfeiture decisions and use of the guilty
property fiction, by declaring that the owner also was liable for the
wrongdoer's acts under the master-servant agency theory 4 or the doc-
trine of negligent entrustment. Almost fifty years after Dobbins's Dis-
tillery, however, the Supreme Court, in J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v.
United States,6 finally offered innocent owners cause for optimism by ac-
knowledging that government seizure of a "truly innocent" owner's
property serves few of the traditional goals of civil forfeiture.
7
In J.W. Goldsmith, the Court upheld the federal government's con-
demnation of a car used in the illegal transport of alcohol. A car deal-
ership initially sold the vehicle contingent upon the understanding that
the dealer would retain title to the car until the buyer completed the
payments. 89 Soon thereafter, the buyer violated tax laws by using the car
illegally to transport liquor.9 " In response to the buyer's actions, the gov-
ernment commenced forfeiture proceedings against the dealership's in-
83. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 15 (finding that "no personal con-
viction of the offender is necessary to enforce a forfeiture"); Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at
233-34 (holding that an owner's lack of knowledge of criminal activity is irrelevant in up-
holding forfeiture under the guilty property fiction and master-servant agency theory);
Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401 (concluding that knowledge of wrongdoing was irrele-
vant under the guilty property fiction or when the owner entrusted property to another).
84. See Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 234.
85. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401.
86. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
87. See id. at 511-12. Although the Court expressed its distaste for forfeitures of in-
nocent owners' property, the Court reserved opinion as to whether the government consti-
tutionally could seize property used in criminal activity which was stolen from an innocent
owner or used without the owner's consent. See id. at 512. The Court's failure to define a
"truly innocent" owner early on has inspired debate on the Court until this day. See Ben-
nis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 999 n.5 (1996). Some of the Justices argue that only a per-
son whose property is stolen or used without consent is deemed an innocent owner. See
id. Other justices contend that an individual who consents to the use of her property, but
not to the illegal manner in which it was used, constitutes an innocent owner. See id.
88. See J. W. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 508, 513.
89. See id. at 508-09.
90. See id. The government separately charged the buyer under federal tax law for
failure to pay taxes on the alcohol in his possession. See id.
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terest.9' The dealership challenged the forfeiture, but the court found for
the government and ordered the dealership to pay the Internal Revenue
Service the amount of the car's value.92
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of the dealer's assertion that the
forfeiture violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights.93 The Court
explained that a property owner's guilt or innocence was immaterial in
an in rem forfeiture proceeding because the guilty property fiction "is too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to
be now displaced., 94 Despite strict adherence to this precedent, the
Court recognized that civil forfeiture laws often lead to unjust results.9
Nonetheless, the Court elected to postpone further consideration of the
innocent owner defense,96 expressly reserving its opinion on whether the
government could seize property stolen from the owner or used without
the owner's consent or whether a grossly disproportionate forfeiture was
constitutional. 97 Rather, the Court stood poised to address the viability
of the innocent owner defense under more favorable circumstances. 9"
91. See id. at 508. The dealer challenged the seizure under the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause arguing that he should have been afforded an innocent owner de-
fense. See id.
92. See id. at 509. Prior to final judgment, the dealership was permitted to post bond
and replevy the vehicle. See id. at 508. Thus, once the Court ordered a judgment, the
dealer was forced to pay for the value of the vehicle. See id. at 509.
93. See id. at 510.
94. Id. at 511.
95. See id. at 510 (expressing concern that the statute "seems to violate that justice
which should be the foundation of the due process of law required by the Constitution").
96. Seeid. at 512.
97. See id.
[I]t is said that a Pullman sleeper can be forfeited if a bottle of illicit liquor be
taken upon it by a passenger, and that an ocean steamer can be condemned to
confiscation if a package of like liquor be innocently received and transported by
it. Whether the indicated possibilities under the law are justified we are not
called upon to consider. It has been in existence since 1866, and has not yet re-
ceived such amplitude of application. When such application shall be made it
will be time enough to pronounce upon it. And we also reserve opinion as to
whether the section can be extended to property stolen from the owner or oth-
erwise taken from him without his privity or consent.
Id.
98. See id. (stating that when the forfeiture statute reaches such "amplitude of appli-
cation... it will be time enough to pronounce upon it").
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Despite the J.W. Goldsmith Court's indications that the Court might,
at some point, be prepared to acknowledge a judicially created innocent
owner defense, the government's forfeiture powers again prevailed over
an innocent owner's property interests in Van Oster v. Kansas.99 The
Court, in Van Oster, held that a state nuisance law authorizing the sei-
zure of vehicles used in the illegal transportation of alcohol did not vio-
late an owner's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.'00 In Van
Oster, an owner allowed the car dealer to use her vehicle in lieu of part of
the purchase price.'°1 Subsequently, an associate of the dealer was ar-
rested for illegally transporting alcohol in the car.' 2 When the govern-
ment brought an action to forfeit the vehicle, the owner intervened, al-
leging that the state forfeiture law violated her right to due process.03
The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the owner's due process claim and
ordered seizure of the car.14
In considering the constitutionality of the Kansas law, the United
States Supreme Court declined to address the innocent owner defense.'5
Relying upon J.W. Goldsmith, the Court again refused to rule on
whether the government could confiscate property stolen or used with-
out the owner's consent, explaining that the plaintiff in the case had con-
sented to the defendant's use of the car.'0 6 The Van Oster Court ulti-
mately rejected the dealer's due process claim and held that nothing in
the Constitution prohibited a state from initiating an in rem forfeiture
proceeding against the car.107
When read together, J.W. Goldsmith and Van Oster suggest that the
Court may have been willing to consider the innocent owner defense un-
99. 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926).
100. See id. Even though the defendant was acquitted in a criminal trial, Kansas seized
the car under the state nuisance law. See id. at 467. The Court simply stated that if an in-
nocent owner entrusts her property to a wrongdoer, she is not entitled to assert innocence
in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding. See id.
101. See id. at 465-66.
102. See id. at 466. The Kansas law declared any vehicle involved in the transportation
of intoxicating liquor to be a common nuisance. See id.
103. See id. The owner asserted that the Kansas statute was unconstitutional because
the law permitted the State to seize her property without proof that she knew of, or con-
sented to, the criminal acts. See id at 466-67.
104. See id. at 466. After the Kansas Supreme Court decision, the associate of the
dealer was acquitted of the alcohol trafficking charge. See id.
105. See id. at 467. Specifically, the Court stated that a person who gives another per-
mission to use her vehicle cannot be an innocent owner. See id. The Court also explained
that certain uses of property are so abhorrent or damaging to society that the innocent
owner surrenders control to the wrongdoer at her own risk. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 467-68.
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der specific factual circumstances in which property was stolen, (8 used
without an owner's consent, '09 or if the seriousness of the seizures was
grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense."0  Nonetheless, in
both cases the Court strictly adhered to the guilty property fiction ar-
ticulated in The Palmyra and refused to consider each owner's lack of
culpability or the unfairness of the seizure in determining the constitu-
tionality of civil forfeitures."'
2. Harsh Conclusion Offers Hope for Innocent Owner Defense
Despite these decisions, the call for recognition of an innocent owner
defense persisted."2 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,"'
the Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico government did not violate
a yacht lessor's due process rights when police confiscated the lessor's
yacht. 14 The government charged the lessee criminally under Puerto
Rico's Controlled Substances Act after the officers discovered marijuana
on board."' The government then seized the boat, but failed to provide
the lessors with actual notice of the forfeiture. " ' Upon learning of the
forfeiture, the lessors brought an action for restoration of their vessel."7
The lower court held that the Puerto Rico statutory sections at issue
were unconstitutional because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
required preseizure notice to innocent owners.""
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that
the Fifth Amendment did not require preseizure notice."9 Citing The
108. See J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921).
109. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
110. See J. W. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 512. In J.W. Goldsmith, the Court also refused to
state whether a truly egregious forfeiture would warrant reconsideration of the innocent
owner defense. See id.
111. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467; J.W. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 511.
112. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974) (sug-
gesting an innocent owner defense despite case law denying property owners such protec-
tion under the Constitution).
113. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
114. See id. at 690.
115. See id. at 665; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 2101 et seq. (1980). The majority opinion
does not indicate the extent of the drug activity on the yacht, but the dissent notes that the
discovery of as little as one marijuana cigarette may have triggered the forfeiture. See id.
at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
116. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 667. The Puerto Rico government brought the
forfeiture action under P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4), (b) (Supp. 1973) and P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 34, § 1722 (1971). See id. at 665 & nn.1-2.
117. See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (D. P.R. 1973).
118. See id. at 1343-44.
119. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679-80. The Court articulated three reasons why
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Palmyra, the Court explained that, historically, the judiciary had devoted
little attention to innocent owner property rights." Consequently, the
Court ruled that Puerto Rico was not required to notify the ship's lessors
before it seized the offending property.
121
Although Calero-Toledo upheld the constitutionality of the Puerto
Rico statute, the Court once again alluded to the inherent unfairness of
forfeiting the property of a truly innocent owner. 22 Moreover, the Court
cited its prior discussions in J. W. Goldsmith and Van Oster and expressed
concern over the constitutionality of seizure cases in which the wrong-
doer obtained the property without the owner's consent, 12 or where an
owner consented to the use of the property but, despite having exercised
every reasonable precaution, was unaware that it would be used in crimi-
nal activity.22 The Court ultimately concluded, however, that the Puerto
Rico forfeiture statute's failure to provide an innocent owner defense
was without constitutional consequence because the yacht owner had en-
• 121
trusted his property to the lessee. Moreover, the Court ruled that the
lessee failed to take reasonable steps to assure that the boat would not be
used to facilitate criminal activity. 12  Still, Calero-Toledo had suggested
that property may be exempt from civil forfeiture when an owner either
preseizure notice was unnecessary in this "extraordinary" situation. See id. First, immedi-
ate seizure served significant government interests by taking harmful instrumentalities out
of public use. See id. at 679. Second, preseizure notice could frustrate the statute's pur-
pose if defendants used the time between notice and the hearing to hide or transfer the
property. See id. Third, law enforcement officials' discretionary powers act to check
abuses of the statutory seizure power. See id.
120. See id. at 683-84. The Court illustrated this point by explaining that Harmony v.
United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844), upheld the forfeiture of a wholly innocent
owner's ship under piracy laws. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684. Moreover, to demon-
strate how minimal an innocent owner's due process rights were, the Court noted that
United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 405 (1814), upheld the forfei-
ture of a bona fide purchaser's interest in coffee when the seller failed to pay customs tax.
See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684 n.24.
121. See id. at 679-80. After the Court addressed the statute's notice provisions, it
considered the propriety of the seizure itself. See id. at 680.
122. See id. The Court remarked that under different circumstances, the broad sweep
of a civil forfeiture statute could "give rise to serious constitutional questions." Id. Not
surprisingly, however, the Court failed to articulate what circumstances would actually
trigger the necessity for a judicially created innocent owner defense. See id.
123. See id. (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921)).
124. See id. at 689-90. Supporting a "best efforts" defense, the Court argued that "a
forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the
prevention of a forfeiture may be employed." Id. at 689 (quoting Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 347, 363 (1808)).
125. See id. at 690.
126. See id.
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did not consent to the wrongdoer's use of the property, or consented
only to the lawful use of the property.1
2 7
C. Placing a Limit on Civil Forfeiture Penalties
In The Palmyra decision in 1827, the Supreme Court relied upon the
guilty property fiction and steadfastly refused to acknowledge that indi-
vidual property rights imposed limitations on the government's forfeiture128
powers. In the years following The Palmyra, however, the Court ap-
peared willing to consider the adoption of a narrow, judicially created in-
nocent owner defense in instances where the wrongdoer lacked consent
or where an egregious forfeiture violated an owner's due process rights. 29
Then, in Calero-Toledo, the Supreme Court indicated that two potential
classes of innocent owners may be entitled to a defense in forfeiture pro-
ceedings.'3° Because the Court applied these defenses so narrowly,
though, only a small fraction of innocent owners would be permitted to
enjoy due process protection against civil forfeiture.'
Prior to 1993, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process chal-
lenges to in rem forfeiture proceedings were common." 2 Then, unex-
pectedly, in Austin v. United States,' the Supreme Court changed its
analytical approach and considered an Eighth Amendment excessive
fines challenge to an alleged disproportionate civil forfeiture. 114 In a
127. See id. at 689-90.
128. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998-99 (1996) (describing the history of
American civil forfeiture law and the continued validity of the guilty property fiction).
129. See J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921)
(sympathizing with innocent owners whose property is used without their consent or who
are subject to an egregious forfeiture, but refusing to articulate a judicially created inno-
cent owner defense).
130. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
The Court suggested that an owner who diligently protects her property, or whose prop-
erty is used without her consent, may be entitled to due process protection from forfeiture.
See id. In Calero-Toledo, however, the lessor's right to exercise control over the yacht was
enough to remove it from the reach of the Court's suggested innocent owner defense. See
id. at 690.
131. See id. at 690.
132. See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 466 (1926) (Fourteenth Amend-
ment); United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1926) (Fifth
Amendment); J.W. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 508 (Fifth Amendment).
133. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
134. See id. at 606. The Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). Unlike The Pal-
myra, Harmony, Dobbins's Distillery, J.W. Goldsmith, Van Oster, and Calero-Toledo,
which were all in rem proceedings, the petitioner in Austin, who sought constitutional re-
view of the forfeiture statute, was also the defendant in the criminal proceeding that trig-
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landmark decision, the Austin Court ruled that the Excessive Fines
Clause applied to civil forfeitures that were punitive in character.135 In
Austin, South Dakota brought a forfeiture action against the petitioner's
house and business following his drug conviction. In his defense, the
petitioner argued that the forfeiture was an unconstitutional excessive
fine under the Eighth Amendment)3 7 Nonetheless, both the district and
circuit courts rejected the petitioner's argument and upheld the State's
authority to forfeit his property.13
Unlike prior challenges to civil forfeiture laws, the petitioner in Austin
conceded that he had used his property to facilitate the drug activities
triggering the drug conviction. He argued, however, that forfeiting his
home and business after he used the property to facilitate a minor infrac-
tion would violate his constitutional rights." After extensively reviewing
the punitive, remedial, and deterrent goals underlying civil forfeitures,
gered the forfeiture. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 604. Thus, the petitioner in Austin was not an
innocent owner.
The Court granted certiorari in Austin to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts as to
whether the Excessive Fines Clause subjected civil forfeiture to proportionality review.
See id. at 605-06. The Second Circuit held in United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive that
the Excessive Fines Clause limited civil forfeitures that served, at least in part, punitive
goals. See 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Second
Circuit and held that the Court's civil forfeiture decisions stood for the proposition that an
owner's constitutional rights were inconsequential in in rem forfeiture proceedings. See
United States v. 508 Depot St., 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992); rev'd, Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit's rationale,
and held that the Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to civil forfeitures. See United
States v. 300 Cove Road, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988).
135. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622. The Court looked to the statute's legislative history
and concluded that the federal law at issue was punitive. See id. The Court described the
seizure as a "'payment to the sovereign as punishment for some offense."' Id. (quoting
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,265 (1989)).
136. See id. at 604. Petitioner was convicted of possessing cocaine with the intent to
distribute prior to the State's action to forfeit his house and business under the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (a)(7) (1994). See
id. at 604-05.
137. See id. at 606.
138. See id. at 605. The circuit court reluctantly concluded that the Constitution could
not mandate a proportionality review of forfeitures when it allowed in rem forfeitures
from innocent owners. See United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th
Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); see also Austin,
509 U.S. at 606.
139. See One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d at 816-17.
140. See id. at 817. Again, the circuit court agreed with Mr. Austin and commented
that the government was "'exacting too high a penalty in relation to the offense commit-
ted,"' but the court was forced to rule against him because of the Supreme Court's long
line of civil forfeiture jurisprudence denying innocent owners all but very limited constitu-
tional protection. Austin, 509 U.S. at 606 (quoting United States v. One Parcel of Prop-
erty, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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the Supreme Court held that, if a civil forfeiture can be characterized as
punitive, the forfeiture must not be disproportionate in relation to the
crime. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case and instructed the
lower courts to develop a test to determine the excessiveness of a sei-
142
zure.
By the time Austin was decided, the Court had relied upon the guilty
property fiction to uphold a state's power to forfeit innocent owners'
property for more than one hundred and fifty years. 14' Due process
challenges to this judicially created legal fiction were generally unsuc-
cessful.1 44  Although the Court expressed displeasure with the guilty
property fiction, and forfeiture of innocent owners' property interests in
Calero-Toledo, it ultimately upheld the forfeiture.4  Similarly, the Austin
Court sympathized with the innocent owner's plight, but did not consider
a due process challenge to civil forfeiture, and limited its holding to the
criminal defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge. 4' Thus, because the
Austin Court neither rejected nor approved of the Calero-Toledo dictum
proposing an innocent owner defense, but adopted a new analytical ap-
proach to assess the constitutionality of civil forfeitures, it was unclear
whether, after Austin, innocent owners should seek constitutional protec-
141. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613-18, 622. In deciding whether a statute was subject to
Eighth Amendment review, the Court stated that the excessive fines test applied to a stat-
ute if even part of the statute's goal was to punish the owner for the wrongdoer's acts. See
id. at 610-11.
142. See id. at 623. The Court did not address whether forfeiting an innocent owner's
property was per se excessive under the Eighth Amendment because the statute at issue
contained an innocent owner provision. See id. at 619. Similarly, the Court expressly re-
fused to address "whether it would comport with due process to forfeit the property of a
truly innocent owner." Id. at 617 n.10.
143. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996); see also Guerra, supra note 13,
at 359-67 (arguing that since The Palmyra, the Court has used the guilty property fiction to
remove civil forfeitures from the reach of property owners' constitutional claims); Nicgor-
ski, supra note 13, at 384-88 (tracing the development of civil forfeiture law predating
Bennis); Noya, supra note 1, at 500-01 (attributing many of the Court's civil forfeiture de-
cisions to the guilty property fiction).
144. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 615-17 (tracing the Court's use of the guilty property fic-
tion to uphold civil forfeitures against constitutional attack since The Palmyra).
145. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-89 (1974)
(noting that "serious constitutional questions" might arise given "the broad sweep of for-
feiture statutes").
146. See id. at 617 n.10, 622; see also Chatman, supra note 13, at 759-61 (discussing the
dearth of Eighth Amendment civil forfeiture jurisprudence).
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tion under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments147 or under the Eighth
Amendment.
148
II. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN: ABROGATING THE INNOCENT OWNER
DEFENSE
A. Due Process Challenge: Upholding State Forfeiture Power
• . 149
In Bennis v. Michigan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its absolute li-
ability approach to civil forfeitures first announced in its early admiralty
• • 150
decisions. In Bennis, the petitioner's spouse had been arrested for en-
gaging in sexual acts with a prostitute inside the family car. 5 ' Alleging
that the Bennises' vehicle was a public nuisance, the State of Michigan
brought a forfeiture action against the car.' Mrs. Bennis contested the
147. See Robert M. Sondak, The Tide Is Turning: Civil Forfeiture Law Is Becoming
More Accommodating to Innocent Owners and Innocent Mortgagees, 48 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 178,179 (1994) ("[Tihe [Austin] Court all but held that under the U.S. Constitu-
tion such a truly innocent owner could not have his property forfeited.").
148. See id. at 179-80 (arguing that Austin helped to diminish the judicial sanction of
formidable civil forfeiture laws and may result in greater constitutional protection for in-
nocent owners). Some state courts applied Austin to innocent owners, and developed "ex-
cessive penalty" tests to guide future decisions. See State v. 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d
534, 541 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court held that, under the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause, the State could not forfeit a family home simply because the po-
lice discovered the husband kept drugs on the premises. See id. at 542. The court's exces-
sive fines analysis focused on the nexus between the home and the criminal activity. See
id. at 541-42. Consequently, when the court determined that seizing the entire house was
excessive, the wife's interest as an innocent owner was preserved. See id. at 542. Other
courts refused to place Eighth Amendment limits on government forfeitures. See Mil-
waukee v. Arrieh, 565 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to apply Eighth
Amendment excessive fines analysis to a nuisance abatement proceeding because nuisance
abatements have "never been considered to be 'punishment' and [have] never triggered an
,excessive fines' analysis").
149. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
150. See id. at 998. Specifically, the majority referred to American civil forfeiture ju-
risprudence as an "unbroken line" of cases, thereby rebuking any claim that the Court had
created a common law innocent owner defense. See id.; see also Boudreaux & Pritchard,
supra note 1, at 615 (explaining that Bennis relied upon the same rationale that evolved in
early admiralty cases); Joi Elizabeth Peake, Note, Bound by the Sins of Another: Civil For-
feiture and the Lack of Constitutional Protection for Innocent Owners in Bennis v. Michi-
gan, 75 N.C. L. REV. 662, 688-89 (1997) (describing the Court's apparent blind adherence
to stare decisis in light of the changing nature of modern civil forfeiture laws and dicta in
its own recent decisions); Will, supra note 40, at C7 (attributing the seemingly unfair result
in Bennis to the Court's early strict liability admiralty decisions).
151. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. The majority opinion noted that Mr. and Mrs. Ben-
nis were co-title holders of the vehicle. See id. at 997.
152. See id at 996. The local nuisance abatement statute authorized the State to sell
cars declared to be public nuisances. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3801 (West 1987
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abatement proceeding, arguing that the Michigan statute did not apply to
property owners who were unaware that their property was used for
113
criminal purposes . The Wayne County Circuit Court rejected her ar-
gument and ordered the sale of the car, concluding that the trial judge's
remedial discretion was sufficient to protect an innocent owner's inter-
ests."'54
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, reasoning
that prior Michigan Supreme Court decisions prohibited the State from
forfeiting a blameless individual's property unless the owner knew the
wrongdoer would use the property for criminal purposes.' Because the
parties had conceded that Mrs. Bennis was unaware of her husband's il-
legal activities, the court of appeals vacated the judgment. 6
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals
and rejected Mrs. Bennis's state and federal constitutional challenges.'57
Maintaining that the court of appeals had misinterpreted Michigan's for-
feiture law, the Michigan Supreme Court held that an owner's culpability
is irrelevant in a civil forfeiture proceeding. 58 Moreover, the Michigan
Supreme Court also rejected Mrs. Bennis's newly asserted due process
challenge, concluding that the statute's failure to supply an innocent
owner defense was inconsequential. 9  In rejecting the due process
& Supp. 1995) (authorizing abatement of enumerated nuisances); see id. § 600.3825(1) (di-
recting the sheriff to sell vehicles that are declared nuisances).
153. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
154. See id. The trial judge relied upon three grounds when he ordered the car sold:
(1) the Bennises owned another car; (2) the trial judge retained the authority to grant one-
half of the sale proceeds to Mrs. Bennis; and (3) the State's costs almost totally depleted
the sale proceeds. See id.
155. See State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731,
733 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
The court of appeals also held that a single act of public indecency did not constitute a
public nuisance. See id. at 735. Without proof that Mr. Bennis had paid for the woman's
services, prostitution allegations alone were insufficient to declare Mr. Bennis's actions a
public nuisance. See id.
156. See id. at 735.
157. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 495
(Mich. 1994), aftPd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). Mrs. Bennis argued that the appellate court de-
cision should be upheld for three reasons: (1) the state failed to prove that an act of prosti-
tution occurred to justify the nuisance abatement; (2) the single incident of lewdness did
not create an abatable nuisance just because Mr. Bennis's transgression had occurred in a
neighborhood known for illicit behavior; and (3) a co-owner's interest in property could
not be forfeited under the Due Process Clause unless the state proved an owner knew that
the property would be used for criminal purposes. See id at 486.
158. See id. at 492-93. The Michigan Supreme Court also disagreed with the circuit
court's decision that a single act of indecency did not constitute a public nuisance. See id.
at 489-91.
159. See id. 494.
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claims, the Michigan Supreme Court relied on United States Supreme
Court decisions, suggesting that only an owner whose car was stolen or
used without consent could assert an innocent owner defense.16 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
Michigan's forfeiture proceedings violated Mrs. Bennis's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause or the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause."'
B. The Majority Opinion: Pirate Ships and Booze Runners Doom
Modern Innocent Owners' Claims
In Bennis, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision and refused to extend the innocent owner de-
fense beyond the boundaries established in The Palmyra and its prog-
eny. 1 2 Writing for the five member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected Mrs. Bennis's contention that the Court's holdings in Calero-
Toledo and Austin prohibited Michigan from forfeiting her property in-
terest in the family car.163 In rejecting Mrs. Bennis's innocent owner de-
fense, the Court dismissed, as dictum, language from earlier decisions
suggesting that inculpable property owners should be entitled to exemp-
160. See id. 493-94 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
683 (1974)); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926)). The Michigan Supreme
Court also noted that the trial court retained discretionary power to mitigate unfair forfei-
tures and to protect an innocent owner's interests. See id. at 495.
161. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997-98 (1996). The United States Supreme
Court dismissed Mrs. Bennis's Takings Clause claim because Michigan had "lawfully ac-
quired [the property] under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power
of eminent domain." Id. at 1001.
162. See id. at 1001. The majority explained that the Court's past decisions, beginning
with The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), formed an unbroken chain of precedent
denying an owner relief from forfeiture without regard to knowledge of the criminal ac-
tivity triggering the forfeiture. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998; see also George M. Dery III,
Adding Injury to Insult.- The Supreme Court's Extension of Civil Forfeiture to Its Illogical
Extreme in Bennis v. Michigan, 48 S.C. L. REV. 359, 379 (1997) ("Chief Justice Rehnquist
relied on The Goldsmith-Grant Co. Court's dodge of an issue as precedent for his placing
the Bennis Court's head in the sand.").
163. See Bennis, 116 . Ct. at 999-1001. The Court rejected Mrs. Bennis's innocence
defense because: (1) she constructively consented to her husband's use of the car as a co-
title holder; and (2) she misunderstood the holding in Calero-Toledo when she argued that
a cautious property owner was entitled to an innocent owner defense. See id. at 999 & n.5.
The Court explained that Calero-Toledo implicitly reiterated the Court's position that
only property stolen or used without the owner's consent may be excluded from govern-
ment forfeiture. See id. at 999. The Court also rejected her argument that Austin limited
Michigan's power to seize her car because Austin did not address the interests of innocent
owners. See id. at 1000. Even if the Court applied the Austin analysis to Mrs. Bennis's
case, the Excessive Fines Clause would not limit the Michigan statute which also sought
non-punitive goals. See id.
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tion from forfeiture. 6' Instead, the Court applied absolute liability prin-
ciples to property owners who consent to the use of their property by
third party wrongdoers.
6 1
1. A Return to The Palmyra
The Bennis majority upheld the forfeiture despite Mrs. Bennis's due
process assertions, reasoning that case law overwhelmingly supported the
constitutionality of civil forfeitures as valid law enforcement mecha-
nisms. 66 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that The Palmyra Court's adop-
tion of the guilty property fiction marked the advent of a well-recognized
civil forfeiture tradition in American law. Although The Palmyra
Court had not addressed the innocent owner defense, the Bennis major-
ity explained that The Palmyra line of cases stood for the proposition
that an owner's culpability is irrelevant in civil forfeiture proceedings.
68
Furthermore, the Bennis majority reaffirmed the continued validity of
the agency theory and the doctrine of negligent entrustment as justifica-
tion for holding property owners responsible for a wrongdoer's acts. 69
Specifically, the Bennis majority cited Harmony and Dobbins's Distillery,
for the proposition that an owner relinquishes control of her property at
her own risk and, therefore, is responsible for ensuring that the property
is not used for illegal purposes.7° Consequently, the majority opinion as-
serted that civil forfeiture rests on three historical principles: (1) the
property itself, rather than the property owner, is accused of the crime;
(2) the owner is responsible for an agent's acts; and (3) the owner is re-
sponsible if she knowingly entrusts property to another.
71
164. See id. at 999 (referring to the suggested "best efforts" innocent owner defense in
Calero-Toledo as "obiter dictum").
165. See id. at 998 (explaining that the guilty property fiction justifies the harsh results
in civil forfeiture cases because the property is considered the defendant in the forfeiture
proceeding, not the property owner (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827)).
166. See id. at 1001 ("We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago, that the cases
authorizing [forfeiture of innocent owners' property] ... are 'too firmly fixed in the puni-
tive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced."' (citation omitted)).
167. See id. at 998. Chief Justice Rehnquist highlighted the significance of The Pal-
myra decision, emphasizing that it firmly established that a property owner's constitutional
rights are not at issue in in rem civil forfeitures. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. The majority opinion reaffirmed Harmony, stating that the shipowner's
master-servant relationship with the crew justified the forfeiture. See id. Similarly, the
majority expressed confidence in its decision in Dobbins's Distillery, explaining that the
forfeiture was justified because the lessor erred when he entrusted his property to the
criminal lessee. See id.
171. See id.
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2. The Next Generation of Forfeitures-Striking the Early Innocent
Owner Defense
The Bennis Court dismissed language contained in previous decisions
suggesting that the Court may create an innocent owner defense under
the proper circumstances .' First, the Bennis majority noted that the
J.W. Goldsmith Court refused to decide if the government could forfeit
an owner's interest in property stolen by a wrongdoer or used without
the owner's consent.' Thus, the majority maintained that the J.W.
Goldsmith Court merely affirmed traditional forfeiture law. 74 Second,
the Bennis Court noted that Van Oster, relying on J.W. Goldsmith, had
declined to consider the owner's lack of culpability when it upheld the
forfeiture of the owner's car.'75 Consequently, the Bennis majority found
that the status of traditional civil forfeiture law was not altered by the
Court's holdings in J. W. Goldsmith or Van Oster.
7 1
3. Obiter Dictum: Dismissing the Call for an Innocent Owner Defense
In urging the Court to adopt an innocent owner defense, Mrs. Bennis
relied on the dictum in Calero-Toledo in which the Court suggested that,
under the proper circumstances, due process may require an innocent
owner defense.7  Specifically, Mrs. Bennis asked the Court to consider
the statement in Calero-Toledo that it would be difficult to punish those
172. See id. at 999 n.5. The majority opined that earlier cases did not alter the Court's
position on the innocent owner defense because Calero-Toledo, J.W. Goldsmith, and Aus-
tin reserved the question of whether an owner whose property 'vas stolen or used without
consent was entitled to an innocent owner defense. See id. at 999 n.5, 1000.
173. See id. at 999 n.5; see also supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's reasoning in J.W. Goldsmith). The majority disagreed with Justice Stevens's
dissenting view that Chief Justice Marshall articulated an innocent owner defense in
Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 364 (1808), which Justice Stevens believed that it
held it was unfair to seize an individual's property if the owner could not employ the
means to prevent the criminal act. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
174. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. The majority emphasized that in Van Oster the
Court expressly declined to comment on the stolen property issue and affirmed J. W. Gold-
smith, thereby demonstrating that the J.W. Goldsmith Court did not create an innocent
owner defense for victims of egregious forfeitures. See id. at 998-99.
175. See id.
176. See id. Some commentators agree with this interpretation of past civil forfeiture
decisions, arguing that the Court steadfastly has refused to deviate from the absolute li-
ability principles established in The Palmyra. See Richard H. Seamon, "Not Now" Does
Not Necessarily Mean "Not Ever": The Supreme Court's Refusal in Bennis v. Michigan to
Abandon the "Guilty Property" Fiction of Forfeiture Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. 389, 391-95
(1997) (agreeing with the Bennis majority and complementing the Court on its bold ad-
herence to past decisions, even when presented with a sympathetic plaintiff).
177. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
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who took all reasonable steps to assure that their property would not be
used in an unlawful manner."' Essentially, Mrs. Bennis alleged that she
was entitled to an innocent owner defense under Calero-Toledo because,
although she implicitly consented to Mr. Bennis's use of the car, she
could not have taken greater precautions to prevent him from using the
vehicle for his criminal enterprise .
The Bennis majority disagreed, however, dismissing the Calero-Toledo
passage as obiter dictum.18 -Again, the Court explained that Calero-
Toledo had no more than reserved the question of whether theft or lack
of consent might, if at all, create a constitutionally required innocent
owner defense."' Here, the Court stated that Mrs. Bennis's circum-
stances were no more compelling than those of any of the defendants in
the Court's prior civil forfeiture cases, and therefore, no departure from
precedent was warranted.
18
4. Dodging the Eighth Amendment
Not only was the Court unwilling to address Mrs. Bennis's due process
challenge on the merits, it also found her Eighth Amendment excessive
fines argument uncompelling. 18 In particular, the Bennis majority re-
jected the assertion that Austin accorded Mrs. Bennis relief from Michi-
gan's forfeiture law.' 84 Because the Austin Court recognized the. applica-
bility of the Excessive Fines Clause in punitive civil forfeiture
proceedings, Mrs. Bennis argued that the forfeiture of her property con-
stituted an excessive penalty prohibited under the Eighth Amendment.
178. See id. The Calero-Toledo Court articulated what might be termed a "best ef-
forts" defense, admitting that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim
of... an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrong-
ful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property." Id. (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974)).
179. See id. In this case, Mrs. Bennis argued that she could not have prevented her
husband's criminal activities because Mr. and Mrs. Bennis owned the car jointly and Mrs.
Bennis was unaware that her husband would use the vehicle to solicit a prostitute. See id.
at 997.
180. See id. at 999. Furthermore, assuming that Mrs. Bennis's circumstances as an in-
culpable co-owner were admitted as a "best efforts" defense, the Court explained that she
could not substantiate the defense because she did not take any greater steps than did the
lessor in Calero-Toledo to insure that her property would not be used illegally. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1000.
184. See id.
185. See id. Mrs. Bennis failed to raise an Eighth Amendment argument in the lower
courts. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich.
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The majority disagreed, explaining that Austin involved government sei-
zures of criminal defendants' property, under a statute providing an in-
nocent owner defense, rather than forfeitures of innocent owners' prop-
erty.' 86 Additionally, the Bennis majority noted that, unlike the forfeiture
in Austin that was solely punitive in nature, the forfeiture in Bennis ad-
vanced both deterrent and punitive goals."' Thus, absent any constitu-
tional protection from seizure, the Bennis majority maintained that Mrs.
Bennis's only salvation from inequitable forfeiture rested in the trial
court's remedial discretion9
C. The Concurring Opinions
1. Justice Thomas: Adhering to Tradition, But Cautious of Abusive
Government Practices
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas emphasized that Michigan's
nuisance abatement scheme was constitutional because civil forfeiture
was an accepted practice in the United States before and after the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Justice Thomas expressed con-
cern, however, that forfeiture proceedings may appear unfair to a public
that is unaware of the long-standing history and tradition of forfeiture
law in American jurisprudence."9  Despite his apprehension, JusticeThomas explained that the Constitution does not bar all government ac-
1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996); State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v.
Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994), affd,
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
186. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 ("There was no occasion in [Austin] to deal with the
validity of the 'innocent-owner defense,' other than to point out that if a forfeiture statute
allows such a defense, the defense is additional evidence that the statute itself is 'punitive'
in motive.").
187. Compare id. (stating that laws that serve punitive and deterrent goals do not fall
within the Austin Court's excessive fines analysis), with Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 622 (1993) (holding that forfeiture laws that serve at least some punitive purpose fall
within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment).
188. See Bennis, 116 U.S. at 1001.
189. See id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 1001 (explaining that a person unfamiliar with our country's history and
the Court's precedent would view Michigan's forfeiture scheme as "lawless"). Justice
Thomas's concern is not unprecedented because judicial sympathy for the innocent
owner's plight has coexisted with decisions upholding harsh applications of civil forfeiture
laws since J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States. See 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921). "If
the [forfeiture of an innocent owner's property] were the first of its kind,... its apparent
paradoxes might compel a lengthy discussion to harmonize the [deprivation] with the ac-
cepted tests of human conduct." Id.
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tion that is "intensely undesirable."' '  He admonished that traditional
due process jurisprudence, rather than subjective notions of unfairness,
sanctioned government forfeitures of innocent owners' property. '92 Fi-
nally, Justice Thomas concluded that although improper and excessive
enforcement of civil forfeiture laws could deprive innocent owners of
their property, the Constitution conferred upon the states the primary
duty to avoid such a result.193
2. Justice Ginsburg: A Simple Decision
Justice Ginsburg also joined in the majority opinion, asserting that be-
cause the vehicle was jointly owned and used with Mrs. Bennis's implied
consent, the only matter before the Court was whether Mrs. Bennis was
entitled to one-half of the car's proceeds. 94 In Justice Ginsburg's view,
only owners who did not consent to the wrongdoer's use of the property
might be entitled to assert an innocent owner defense.'95 Therefore, be-
cause Mrs. Bennis consented to her husband's use of the car, she fell out-
side of any constitutionally mandated innocent owner defense. 96 Fur-
thermore, Justice Ginsburg characterized as "critical" to the Court's due
process analysis the equitable nature of Michigan's nuisance abatement
law which accorded the state courts the power to monitor its enforce-
ment.97 Because both parties agreed that Michigan had the power to ac-
191. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001-02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
192. See id. 1003 (explaining that "the Constitution apparently assigns to the States
and to the political branches of the Federal Government the primary responsibility for
avoiding [unjust forfeitures]"). Although Justice Thomas believed that the executive and
legislative branches were responsible for policing excessive forfeiture laws, he suggested
that, at some point, an egregious forfeiture may violate a property owner's constitutional
rights. See id. at 1002-03. Justice Thomas suggested a test by which courts should com-
pare each new seizure case with prior forfeiture decisions to determine if the government
violated the property owner's due process rights. See id. at 1002. Applying his own test,
Justice Thomas noted that the Bennises' rather ordinary forfeiture must be constitutional
because the forfeiture was no more unfair than any of the forfeitures set forth in The Pal-
myra line of cases. See id.
193. See id. at 1003.
194. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the dissent's excessive fines analy-
sis was inapplicable to Mrs. Bennis's cause of action because the dissent overlooked the
Michigan nuisance abatement statute's remedial and deterrent goals, inappropriately
characterizing the law as punitive and therefore subject to the Austin analysis).
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. Specifically, Justice Ginsburg's argument closely resembles the last part of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion where he explained that the Michigan trial court's dis-
cretionary power would mitigate harsh forfeiture laws. Compare id. at 1001 (explaining
that judicial discretion would ameliorate unfair forfeitures), with id. (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (same). Justice Stevens, however, asserted that Justice Ginsburg's reliance on the
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tually seize the car, Justice Ginsburg explained that the lower courts bore
the responsibility of distributing the proceeds equitably.198 In her view,
therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to
reimburse Mrs. Bennis for her interest in the car because the State's costs
offset any outstanding proceeds from the car's sale.199
D. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer and Souter, dissented, argu-
ing that Michigan's forfeiture law violated the Due Process Clause and
the Excessive Fines Clause.2 ° Justice Stevens argued that the forfeiture
of Mrs. Bennis's property was unconstitutional for three distinct reasons:
(1) the connection between Mrs. Bennis's car and her husband's viola-
tion was insufficient; (2) Mrs. Bennis was an innocent owner; and (3) the
forfeiture of the Bennises' car was an excessive penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. 1 Justice Kennedy also dissented, arguing that by failing to
import a culpability requirement or a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gent entrustment in automobile forfeiture cases, the Bennis majority un-
constitutionally favored Michigan's crime-fighting objectives over Mrs.
Bennis's property interests.2
1. Justice Stevens: Nexus Theory, Culpability Requirement, and
Excessive Penalty Analysis
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's holding marked a
critical departure from its prior holdings in which the government was
permitted only to seize property that actually facilitated the underlying
criminal act.203 Justice Stevens identified three categories of property
subject to civil forfeiture: contraband, proceeds derived from criminal ac-
trial court's discretionary power was misplaced because he believed that the lower court
abused its discretionary power in this case. See id. at 1009 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the trial judge's decision
could be overturned only if manifestly unreasonable).
199. See id. Justice Ginsburg also was concerned that the dissent's position would de-
ter states from implementing nonpunitive schemes to curb prostitution. See id.
200. See id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. See id. Justice Stevens maintained that the Court's past decisions protected
blameless owners by allowing the Court to consider the owner's culpability or the connec-
tion between the property and the crime as threshold requirements in the forfeiture pro-
ceeding. See id. at 1007-08. In addition, he believed that Michigan's forfeiture action was
unconstitutionally excessive. See id. at 1010.
202. See id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy distinguished automo-
bile owners' due process rights from the rights of shipowners in the Court's early absolute
liability admiralty forfeiture cases. See id.
203. See id. at 1003-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tivity, and instruments that facilitate proscribable acts. °4 In his view, the
government always can seize contraband and tainted proceeds because
the government has a strong remedial and restitutionary interest in de-
priving criminals of the tools and proceeds of their criminal activities.,2°
With respect to the third category, Justice Stevens maintained that for-
feiting instrumentalities used in criminal activity was difficult to reconcile
with traditional forfeiture jurisprudence because the government obtains
few benefits from such forfeitures and the potential harm to inculpable
property owners is great.2"" To best balance the government's needs
against the property owner's due process rights, Justice Stevens asserted
that criminal instruments can be confiscated by the government only if
the instrument bears a sufficient connection to the underlying offense.' °7
Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that the majority improperly ap-
plied precedent because the Bennises' car did not truly facilitate Mr.
208Bennis's wrongful act.
Even if the Court found that the Bennises' car facilitated Mr. Bennis's
acts, however, Justice Stevens argued that Michigan could not forfeit the
property of a wholly blameless owner. Specifically, he interpreted The
Palmyra line of cases as having barred government forfeiture unless the
owner was, at a minimum, negligent for entrusting the property to the
wrongdoer.21° Under this standard, Justice Stevens concluded that
Michigan's seizure of Mrs. Bennis's property was improper because, as
both parties conceded, she was wholly without fault for her husband's
211conduct.
204. See id. at 1004-05.
205. See id. at 1004.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 1006. Justice Stevens noted that in the cases the majority relied upon,
the property seized actually facilitated the crime. See id. at 1005-06.
208. See id. Justice Stevens argued that the car in this case did not facilitate Mr. Ben-
nis's offense because the sexual acts could have occurred anywhere. See id. at 1006.
209. See id. at 1007.
210. See id. Justice Stevens relied on Austin where the Court stated that forfeiture de-
cisions "rested 'at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his
property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that negligence."' Id. (quoting
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993)). Justice Stevens argued that this text
from Austin indicated that the government must prove that the property owner negligently
entrusted the offending property to the wrongdoer in order to succeed in a civil forfeiture
action. See id.
211. See id. In addition, Justice Stevens urged that even if an innocent owner was
strictly liable for a third party's actions, Calero-Toledo provided the owner with a "best
efforts" defense, exempting the individual from forfeiture if she took reasonable steps to
ensure that her property was not used for criminal purposes. See id. at 1007-08; see also
supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Calero-Toledo Court's sug-
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Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that the majority erred when it re-
fused to recognize that seizure of the Bennises' car violated the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. 2 According to Justice Stevens,
Michigan's appropriation of Mrs. Bennis's car was an excessive penalty
because the State used a punitive statute to seize property belonging to
an owner who was without fault for the criminal acts triggering the dep-
rivation."' Furthermore, he argued that the seizure surely was dispropor-
tionate because Mrs. Bennis's harm was far greater than the benefit
Michigan gained by punishing Mr. Bennis for the one isolated incident.214
2. Justice Kennedy: Forfeiture Only for Criminal or Negligent Owners
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the majority opinion and with Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion.215 Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy
agreed with the majority's interpretation that The Palmyra line imposed
absolute liability on property owners when they loaned their property to
gested "best efforts" defense).
212. See Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens declared
that, under Austin, the property owner's status as a criminal defendant or an innocent
owner did not alter the Eighth Amendment analysis so long as the forfeiture was punitive.
See id. Many commentators have agreed with Justice Stevens's interpretation of Austin,
urging the Court to strike civil forfeitures that disproportionately affect innocent owners.
See Sondak, supra note 147, at 179-80 (predicting that the Austin analysis will give rise to
court decisions that are more receptive to innocent owner defenses); R. Todd Ingram,
Comment, The Crime of Property: Bennis v. Michigan and the Excessive Fines Clause, 74
DENV. U. L. REV. 293, 303 (1996) (arguing that Michigan's nuisance abatement scheme
was punitive, not solely remedial, and therefore subject to the Austin excessive fines
analysis).
213. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. See id. (asserting that even a partial forfeiture would be excessive because Mrs.
Bennis was completely without blame for her husband's acts).
215. See id. at 1010-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy disagreed with the
majority opinion because he believed the facts warranted a showing that Mrs. Bennis was
negligent or criminally culpable before Michigan seized the car. See id. at 1011. He also
disagreed with Justice Stevens's dissent because he believed that the forfeitures in The
Palmyra line of cases did not rely on proof that the property owner was negligent in en-
trusting his property to a wrongdoer, but instead, imposed absolute liability on shipowners
to avoid the difficult jurisdictional problems of bringing suits against European defen-
dants. See id. at 1010.
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crimial , 211criminal wrongdoers. Justice Kennedy explained, however, that the
majority opinion failed to recognize that automobiles were a unique form
of property that was essential to the daily lives of many Americans and
should not be seized by the government without just cause."' To permit
society to function smoothly, he believed that a strong presumption of
negligent entrustment or criminal complicity would protect the govern-
ment's crime-fighting objectives and still give the owner the opportunity
to rebut the presumption and recover her property. 21' Applying the cul-
pability standard to the facts in the Bennis case, Justice Kennedy argued
that Michigan could not forfeit Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car because
the State failed to demonstrate that she negligently entrusted the car to
her husband or that she had knowledge of his criminal activity." 9
III. REJECTING THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE IN
CIVIL FORFEITURE CLAIMS
A. Mired in the Historical Fiction
1. Rewriting Civil Forfeiture History Through Stare Decisis
Ultimately, the Bennis majority declined to adopt an innocent owner
defense."O As a result, the Court destroyed what little momentum prop-
216. See id. at 1011. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy also observed that the well-
established forfeiture tradition in admiralty had never justified the wholesale disregard of
a property owner's blamelessness. See id. He contended that the absolute liability stan-
dard should be retained when possible because the Calero-Toledo "best efforts" defense
was difficult to apply and because in rem forfeitures were useful tools for promptly re-
dressing injuries caused by criminal activity. See id.; see also supra notes 122-27 and ac-
companying text (discussing the "best efforts" test from Calero-Toledo).
217. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. See id.
219. See id. (observing that Mrs. Bennis's property interest was not so insignificant
that Michigan could deny her due process protection).
220. See id. at 1001; see also Will, supra note 40, at C7. Will argues that, although the
Court should not abandon established precedent hastily, societal changes often warrant a
reassessment of seemingly principled decisions. See id. Concerned with the adverse im-
pact Bennis may have on private property owners, Will warns that many poorly reasoned
Supreme Court decisions have lasting effects on American Society. See id. (explaining the
damaging effects the Scott v. Sandford (the Dred Scott case), Plessy v. Ferguson, and
Lochner v. New York decisions had on American political and social life); see also The Su-
preme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 139-41 (criticizing the Bennis
Court for its "rote application of time-worn holdings," while ignoring the glaring inequity
that results when strict liability is used to forfeit innocent owners' property). But see Ben-
nis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. The Bennis majority suggested that the Court might depart from
the strict liability standard if the government seized property that had been stolen from an
innocent owner or if an extremely egregious forfeiture came before the Court. See id. at
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221
erty rights advocates gained in the Calero-Toledo and Austin decisions.
Furthermore, although Bennis may be consistent with the Court's his-
torical precedent on government civil forfeiture powers, the result is nei-
212ther equitable nor logical . Since J.W. Goldsmith, many of the Supreme
Court's civil forfeiture rulings upheld broad forfeiture laws, simultane-
ously expressing concern for innocent owners' due process rights.2 ' The
999 n.5, 1000. One commentator expressed frustration with respect to the majority's re-
fusal to label Mrs. Bennis as the long awaited "truly innocent owner" and posited that it
would be difficult to imagine an individual more deserving of such a classification. See
Luna, supra note 18, at 423-24.
221. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Calero-
Toledo established an innocent owner exception even for laws that impose strict liability
on the property owner); id. at 1010 (arguing that Austin established an Eighth Amend-
ment limitation on all civil forfeiture actions). Before the Court decided Bennis, some
commentators predicted that Austin would give rise to an excessive fines limitation on for-
feitures of innocent owners' property. See Robert M. Sondak, Justice to Rule on Forfeiture
of Innocent Owner's Property, 5 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1, 5-6 (June 1995) (pre-
dicting, before Bennis was decided, that the Court would use Austin to strike down Michi-
gan's forfeiture scheme in Bennis). After Bennis, many property rights advocates were
shocked in light of the Court's position in Calero-Toledo and Austin. See Joan Biskupic,
Court Upholds Criminal Forfeiture Law: States Can Seize Belongings Used in Offenses--
Even if Owner Is Innocent, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at Al (describing the Bennis
decision as surprising to attorneys on both sides of the issue); Kevin Johnson, Seizure
Ruling Thrills Police; Others Fearful, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 1996, at 5A (stating that
advocates of private property rights were stunned by the Bennis decision). Similarly, the
Bennis decision surprised lower courts that had adopted the Calero-Toledo Court's "best
efforts" innocent owner defense. See United States v. 4560 Kingsbury Rd., No. 93-3054,
1994 WL 28772, at **2 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1994), 16 F.3d 1222, 1223 (6th Cir. 1994). Finally,
the Bennis Court's rejection of Mrs. Bennis's Eighth Amendment claim also shocked
lower courts applying an Excessive Fines Clause analysis to innocent owners under Austin.
See State v. 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d 534, 540-41 (Utah 1994).
222. See Ingram, supra note 212, at 306-07. Ingram argues that the Bennis Court erred
by declaring Michigan's forfeiture law to be non-punitive, and thus not subject to the limi-
tations prescribed under the Excessive Fines Clause. See id. at 303. Ingram maintains that
"[c]ommon sense dictates that the deprivation of Ms. Bennis's interest in the vehicle pun-
ished [her] for an ultimately unwise 'investment."' Id. at 306-07. Accordingly, an accurate
analysis under established jurisprudence would require the Court to consider "whether
Ms. Bennis's punishment was constitutionally 'excessive."' Id. at 307; cf. State v. Rice, 626
P.2d 104, 114 (Alaska 1981) (questioning that, because forfeitures advance punitive goals,
"what purpose is served by punishing the owner who has done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent illegal use ... considering the minimal control that [an owner] has
over an item whose ownership is in the hands and direct control of another?"). Moreover,
Bennis is not analogous to early admiralty forfeiture cases that resorted to the guilty prop-
erty fiction to avoid difficulties associated with obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a
foreign shipowner. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The prospect
of deriving prompt compensation from in rem forfeiture, and the impracticality of adjudi-
cating the innocence of the owners or their good-faith efforts in finding a diligent and
trustworthy master, combined to eliminate the owner's lack of culpability as a defense.").
223. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 692 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (expressing that the government should not seize the
property of a wholly innocent owner). Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence extending
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Bennis majority, however, ignored the realities of modern civil forfeiture
laws and, instead, provided a history lesson to the American people-a
lesson that offers innocent property owners little protection from aggres-
sive law enforcement policies, revenue-hungry legislators, and unyielding
trial court judges.224
2. Creating an All-Encompassing Strict Liability Standard in Forfeiture
Proceedings
The Court's holding in Bennis was improper because the Court blindly
rejected language in its earlier decisions calling for an innocent owner
defense. First, the majority improperly dismissed the good faith innocent
owner defense articulated in Calero-Toledo.225  In Calero-Toledo, the
additional procedural due process safeguards to property owners in forfeiture proceedings
seems to recognize that owners are not completely without constitutional protection from
arbitrary forfeitures. See Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1780 (1996) (explaining
that property owners are constitutionally guaranteed the right to a hearing in order to con-
test a forfeiture); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53
(1993) (explaining that prior notice and opportunity for a meaningful hearing are "central
to the Constitution's command of due process"). Furthermore, the Bennis majority ig-
nored the fact that lower federal and state courts have long expressed concerns that forfei-
ture laws infringe upon the due process rights of property owners. See, e.g., Rice, 626 P.2d
at 113-14 (holding that while the United States Supreme Court has declined to recognize a
due process innocent owner defense, the Alaska constitution did afford innocent owners
due process protection); In re One 1965 Ford Mustang v. State, 463 P.2d 827, 834 (Ariz.
1970) (holding that "an automobile may not be forfeited ... unless the owner had some
connection with the unlawful act, or intended to permit the automobile to be used by a
third person in the commission of the unlawful act, or had knowledge it was to be so
used"); State v. Hochhausler, 668 N.E.2d 457, 468-69 (Ohio 1996) (indicating that the gov-
ernment's failure to establish probable cause for the confiscation of an owner's vehicle un-
til several days after the seizure was executed was not supported by any governmental in-
terest and constituted a manifest violation of due process).
224. See Steven L. Kessler, Civil Forfeiture's Supreme Challenge After Bennis and
Ursery, 10 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1, 14 (1996) (suggesting that to avoid the poten-
tially harsh results of Bennis, enforcement officials should learn to view forfeiture situa-
tions "as if they or their relatives were the claiming third party"); Melissa N. Cupp, Note,
Bennis v. Michigan: The Great Forfeiture Debate, 32 TULSA L.J. 583, 601 (1997) (catalog-
ing predictions that Bennis will encourage legislators to abolish statutory innocent owner
defenses).
225. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999. Specifically, the Court wrongfully criticized the dis-
sent's argument that a truly innocent owner should be exempt from forfeiture in reliance
on Peisch v. Ware, where Chief Justice John Marshall stated that "'a forfeiture can only be
applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a for-
feiture may be employed."' Id. at 999 n.5 (quoting Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347,
363 (1808)). The majority insisted that Chief Justice Marshall was referring to situations
in which the seized property had been stolen from the owner. See id. But in Peisch, the
Court refused to uphold the forfeiture because the ship's owner did not have the means to
remove the cargo from the ship-wrecked vessel when his crew deserted. See Peisch, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) at 363. Consequently, the Court refused to forfeit the cargo when local resi-
dents unloaded the ship and refused to pay the import duties because the shipowner could
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Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require the government
to provide preseizure notice to property owners under Puerto Rico's
drug forfeiture laws.226 In the process, however the Court articulated a
"best efforts" defense for innocent owners which is consistent with tradi-
tional due process principles and comports with property owners' expec-
227tations.
Alternatively, assuming the "best efforts" defense is rejected as mere
dictum, the majority's reasoning creates a logical inconsistency. Persons
who do not consent to a wrongdoer's use of their property may be enti-
tled to a defense, while persons who implicitly consent to the wrong-
doer's use of the property, but take every reasonable effort to prevent
the illegal use of the property, are subject to forfeiture. 2' For example,
under Bennis, the government may not be able to confiscate a car if a
thief was convicted of driving the car while under the influence of alcohol
even after the owner recklessly left the car on a busy street, with the keys
in the ignition, the motor running, and an open bottle of scotch on the
seat, because the owner did not expressly or implicitly consent to the
not unload the ship's contents and pay the bounty without a crew. See id. at 363-64. Curi-
ously, the Bennis majority claimed that Peisch had addressed the same question reserved
in J. W. Goldsmith-whether an owner whose property was stolen, and subsequently for-
feited, was an innocent owner. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. If the majority's interpre-
tation of Peisch is accurate, however, then the innocent owner question reserved in every
case since J.W. Goldsmith, including Bennis, was conclusively settled by Justice Marshall
in 1808. See id. By arguing that Peisch was limited to stolen property, the Bennis majority
implicitly conceded the existence of some form of an innocent owner defense. Compare
id. (maintaining that J.W. Goldsmith "expressly reserved opinion 'as to whether [the gov-
ernment may confiscate] property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken from him
without his privity or consent' (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. - Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921))), with Peisch, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 364 ("If, by private theft, or
open robbery, without any fault on his part, his property should be invaded, while in the
custody of the officer of the revenue, the law cannot ... punish him with the forfeiture of
that property.").
226. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677 (1974).
227. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 162-65 (explaining the impact of the Calero-Toledo
decision's suggested "best efforts" innocent owner defense on lower courts and on federal
legislation exempting innocent owners who take reasonable efforts to ensure that their
property is not used for criminal purposes); see also supra notes 190-91 and accompanying
text (discussing Justice Thomas's observation in Bennis that forfeitures may appear "law-
less" to persons unfamiliar with Court precedent). The fact that the federal government
and many states have recently included innocent owner defenses in their civil forfeiture
statutes demonstrates expressed abhorrence for forfeiture of blameless owners' property.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:64-5 (West 1995); H.R. 1916,
104th Cong. (1995) (proposed federal asset forfeiture reform act providing for an innocent
owner defense under a number of federal asset forfeiture provisions).
228. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. The majority reserved its opinion as to whether
the government can seize an individual's property when the wrongdoer stole it or used it
without the owner's consent. See id.
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car's use. 2 9 In contrast, the government could seize a mother's car after
her child, a co-owner of the car, was convicted of driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol, even after she forbade him from drinking, took away his
keys, traveled to a bar to pick him up, attempted to prevent him from
getting behind the wheel, and called the police to stop him, because, as
his mother, the court may determine that she implicitly consented to his
use of her car and because Bennis denies her the right to a "best efforts"
defense.230
Undoubtedly, the Bennis decision placed Mrs. Bennis, and other joint
owners in an inescapable dilemma. After Bennis, co-owners and secured
parties are subject to absolute liability for the unpredictable acts of co-
owners or debtors, even though the innocent parties do not possess the
legal means to prevent the co-owner or debtor from using the property.
23
'
3. Criminals Get Constitutional Protection From Forfeitures While
Wholly Innocent Parties Enjoy Strict Liability
The Bennis majority further erred when it rejected Mrs. Bennis's ar-
gument that Austin barred disproportionate forfeitures of innocent own-
ers' property."' The Austin Court held that the Eighth Amendment Ex-
229. See id. (reporting the long reserved question whether "'[i]f, by private theft, or
open robbery, without any fault on his part, [an owner's] property should be in-
vaded,... the law cannot be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that prop-
erty"') (quoting Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347,364 (1808)).
230. See id. at 999 (denying that an individual that took reasonable steps to prevent
the illegal use of her property was entitled to an exemption from civil forfeiture). As co-
title holder, Mrs. Bennis was powerless to prevent Mr. Bennis from using the family car
because, as Justice Ginsburg noted, Mrs. Bennis implicitly consented to his use of the ve-
hicle by virtue of her co-ownership. See id. at 999; see also id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring); id. at 999 n.5 ("Because John Bennis co-owned the car at issue, [Tina Bennis]
cannot claim [that John used the car without her consent].").
231. Compare id. at 999 (characterizing as dictum the Calero-Toledo Court's reference
to a "reasonable efforts" defense and arguing that even if the defense was recognized,
Mrs. Bennis failed to demonstrate that she took the necessary precautions to assert it),
with id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Without knowledge that [her husband] would
commit [a criminal] act in the family car .... surely [Mrs. Bennis] cannot be accused of
failing to take 'reasonable steps' to prevent the illicit behavior."). See William Lee Bor-
den, Jr., Real Estate Forfeiture Under Federal Law, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 164,
167-68 (1994) (analyzing the impact of civil forfeiture laws on innocent joint tenants);
Barnes, supra note 4, at 1273 (noting that, as a co-title holder, there was very little that
"[Mrs. Bennis] could do to prevent her husband's illegal acts"); Yanich, supra note 4, at
13A (noting that, in oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy asked the
Solicitor General whether, to protect their property interests, wives had to call the police if
they suspected that their husband solicited prostitutes).
232. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Austin
Court "established that when a forfeiture constitutes 'payment to a sovereign as punish-
ment for some offense'.. . it is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Ex-
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cessive Fines Clause limited the enforcement of punitive civil forfei-
tures.2" However, the Bennis Court opined that the Austin rationale still
accorded Mrs. Bennis no relief.3 4 First, because Austin involved a statute
that provided an innocent owner defense, the Bennis majority held that
235Austin did not control in Mrs. Bennis's case. Second, even if Austin
applied, the Bennis majority maintained that, unlike the punitive statute
in Austin, Michigan's forfeiture statute served both deterrent and puni-
tive goals.236
In Austin, however, not only did the Court express displeasure with the
plight of innocent owners, but the Court also held that a statute seeking
to deter future criminal acts can be characterized as punitive and is sub-
ject to the Excessive Fines Clause.237 The Bennis Court, therefore, should
have extended Eighth Amendment protection to Mrs. Bennis because it
conceded that the statute served both punitive and deterrent goals. 2" By
failing to do so, the Court effectively granted criminals greater constitu-
tional protection from civil forfeitures than innocent owners.239
cessive Fines Clause"); LEVY, supra note 2, at 204 (predicting before Bennis that Austin
would be extended to protect innocent owners from disproportionate forfeitures); Ingram,
supra note 212, at 307-09 (asserting that the Bennis Court wrongfully ignored Austin in
refusing to apply either the proportionality or instrumentality test to the Bennis forfei-
ture). But see Nicgorski, supra note 13, at 388 (arguing that "the excessiveness of any for-
feiture should be measured by the degree and extent of the property's involvement in the
offense, not the owner's culpability" and thereby rejecting the argument that forfeiture of
an innocent owner's property is per se excessive without additional inquiry into the nature
of the crime and the property deprivation). One commentator has argued that Austin
does not apply to civil forfeitures of innocent owners' property because if such seizures are
characterized as "punishment," then the Court's refusal to apply double jeopardy protec-
tion to civil forfeitures is implausible. See Seamon, supra note 176, at 401.
233. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993).
234. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 1000-01. The Bennis majority misread the Austin Court's reasoning,
because, in Austin, the Court held that if a law served any punitive purpose, the statute
was subject to Eighth Amendment limitations. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621; Kessler, supra
note 224, at 13 (surmising that the above distinction "appears to stand the Court's prior
ruling on its head and take precedent at least two steps backwards, since it was that forfei-
ture which was at least partially punitive, causing the Court to emphasize in Austin the ap-
plication of the Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeiture actions, not the other way
around").
237. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
238. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 ("[F]or the reasons pointed out in Calero-Toledo
and Van Oster, forfeiture also serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive pur-
pose.").
239. See Brief for Petitioner at 18 n.12, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No.
94-8729).
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4. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions Fail to Provide Answers
In denying innocent owners Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment protec-
tion against civil forfeiture, the majority and Justice Ginsburg reasoned
that the trial court's remedial discretionary powers would preclude abu-
sive government seizures."' Justice Thomas, however, relied on the po-
litical branches to police inequitable forfeitures. 1 As Justice Stevens
noted in his dissent, the majority unjustifiably relied upon the trial
court's discretionary authority to avoid harsh forfeitures because, as
Bennis itself clearly illustrated, unless trial judges are bound constitu-
tionally to consider the rights of innocent owners, these owners will in-
evitably suffer injustice at the trial court level.242 Similarly, Justice Tho-
240. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (commenting that the trial courts are empowered to
mitigate unfair government seizures); see id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing
that an abatement proceeding is an "equitable action" in which the state court "stands
ready to police exorbitant applications of the statute").
241. See id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas acknowledged the po-
tential danger of arbitrary government seizures, but because he believed innocent owners'
property rights were not constitutionally protected, he interpreted the Constitution as
delegating to the political branch the task of monitoring unfair government forfeitures.
See id.
242. See id. at 1009 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's reliance
on the trial court's remedial powers to protect innocent owners from exorbitant or oppres-
sive seizures is misplaced because the lower court did not protect Mrs. Bennis); HYDE,
supra note 1, at 61-64. Congressman Hyde proposed a stronger innocent owner defense
because not all courts exercise their discretionary powers in an equitable fashion; some
courts have established narrow innocent owner defenses, while others have created broad
categories of exemptions from government forfeitures. See id. at 61-62 (citing United
States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990)). The proposed text would amend
a number of federal asset forfeiture laws. See H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1995). Specifically,
the proposed amendments to the popularly invoked Federal Controlled Substances Act
generally represent the Act's reach, stating:
(a) In General-Section 511 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)) is amended -
(1) in paragraph (4)(C), by striking "without the knowledge, consent, or
willful blindness of the owner." and inserting "either without the knowledge of
that owner or without the consent of that owner."
Id. at § 8(a)(1). The amendment would effectively change the federal anti-drug provisions
to include a "best efforts" defense similar to the one referenced by the Court in Calero-
Toledo. Compare id. § 8(b)(1) (proposing to amend 21 U.S.C. § 881 by adding the fol-
lowing-"property shall not be considered to have been used for a proscribed use without
the knowledge or... consent of the owner.., if that owner... failed to take reasonable
steps to prevent the proscribed use"), with Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974) ("[lt would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an
owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity
or consent ... [or when] he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property."). By codifying the "best efforts" defense, Congress could
reduce trial courts' discretionary power and ensure uniformity in the application of federal
asset forfeiture laws, presumably offering innocent owners greater protection from gov-
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mas's reliance on the political branches to curb abusive forfeiture stat-
utes is also implausible: history reveals that legislatures and the executive
branches have continued to expand, rather than restrict, government for-
feiture powers. 3 Consequently, the majority and concurring Justices'
confidence in the political and lower judicial branches of the government
remains unsupported by historical practice and the current movement
towards broad civil forfeiture laws.2"
While Justice Stevens accurately characterized the Bennis decision as
inherently unfair to the interests of innocent owners, his abstract inter-
pretations of earlier forfeiture cases drew attention away from the prin-
cipal issue in Bennis: the adoption of a judicially created innocent owner
defense under the Due Process Clause.14 For example, Justice Stevens
insisted that the Court's prior forfeiture decisions rested upon a "nexus
theory"-the presumption that the government could seize only property
that is sufficiently connected to or employed in the commission of pro-
scribable conduct. 6 However, until the Court abandons the policy of
eminent seizures. See generally HYDE, supra note 1, at 71-84 (discussing proposed
amendments to civil forfeiture statutes). See also Guerra, supra note 13, at 391-92 (ex-
plaining that the courts' equitable powers should be used to alleviate the harsh impact of
forfeitures on families). But see Kessler, supra note 224, at 13 (suggesting that Bennis may
be limited to its facts and that the lower court may have properly exercised its discretion-
ary powers when it decided that deterring men from soliciting prostitutes was more impor-
tant than granting relief to Mrs. Bennis).
243. See HYDE, supra note 1, at 9-10 (explaining that because an increasing number of
jurisdictions apply civil forfeiture to any criminal activity, "owners must police their prop-
erty against all possible criminal activity-or lose it"); Richard C. Reuben, One Crime,
Two Punishments: Asset Forfeiture Cases Offer Chance to Sort Out Double Jeopardy Is-
sues, 81 A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (Dec. 1995) (noting that, as of December 1995, there were more
than 100 federal civil forfeiture laws); Piety, supra note 1, at 911-27 (tracking the legisla-
tive expansion of civil forfeiture laws). Unfortunately, history reveals that the federal
government and the states are unwilling to police civil forfeitures because seizures are
both an effective crime-fighting tool and a readily available source of government funding.
See HYDE, supra note 1, at 35 (alleging "[a]s if on the narcotics they are supposed to con-
trol and suppress, law enforcement agencies at all levels have become addicted to forfei-
ture as a source of ready cash to supplement their budgets"). Governments prefer civil
forfeiture laws because law enforcement can inflict immediate economic injury on the
criminal wrongdoer and the government must overcome minimum procedural rules in
court, including a lower burden of proof than is required in criminal forfeiture proceed-
ings. Cf. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that Michigan
"wants to punish, for deterrence and perhaps also for retributive purposes, persons who
may have colluded or acquiesced in criminal use of their property... [b]ut... it does not
want to have to prove ... collusion, acquiescence, or negligence"); see also Meyer, supra
note 1, at 866 ("With civil forfeiture we see the worst of both worlds; proceedings and
penalties which appear criminal, but which do not enjoy constitutional protection.").
244. See Piety, supra note 1, at 911-27.
245. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. See id.
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absolute liability in forfeiture cases and adopts an innocent owner de-
fense, the relationship between the forfeited property and the commis-
sion of the offense is wholly irrelevant. 4 Thus, Justice Stevens failed to
dissect the majority's weak due process analysis, by urging the Court
simply to reconsider its civil forfeiture precedent, rather than to adopt an
innocent owner defense that is consistent with the undeniable realities
facing contemporary property owners.
B. The Majority Opinion's Impact on Future Forfeiture Powers
Prior to Bennis, adoption of a judicially created innocent owner de-
fense seemed a plausible and likely extension of the rationales enunci-
241
ated in Calero-Toledo and Austin. Surprisingly, the Bennis majority re-
247. See id. at 998. Not only did the majority reject Justice Stevens's nexus theory, but
Chief Justice Rehnquist repeated the 75-year-old adage from J.W. Goldsmith, that when
the Court is presented with an egregious forfeiture it will then decide whether there must
be a minimal connection between the property and the underlying criminal acts before the
government can institute forfeiture proceedings. See id. at 1000. The majority clearly sent
property owners an ambiguous message by first stating that civil forfeitures do not impli-
cate the innocent owner's constitutional rights under the guilty property fiction, but then
stating that the Court may reconsider its position if presented with an egregious forfeiture
where the government seized property only tangentially related to criminal activity. See
id. at 999-1000. If, under the guilty property fiction, the property stands accused of the
crime, then under the Court's reasoning, if the government seizes property tenuously con-
nected to a crime, the owner's constitutional rights should not be implicated by the seizure
because any injustice resulting from the forfeiture is visited upon the property, not the
property owner. See id. In addition, the Court has acknowledged in other contexts that
innocent owners are entitled to limited constitutional rights in forfeiture proceedings in-
cluding, for example, preseizure notice and a meaningful hearing. See Degen v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 1781-82 (1996) (hearing); United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (notice and a hearing). The Bennis majority failed to ex-
plain, and Justice Stevens failed to note, however, that if civil forfeitures do not implicate
innocent owners' constitutional rights, then why has the Court extended other constitu-
tional protections to innocent owners? Compare Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (explaining that
a rich history of Supreme Court case law holds that an owner's interest in property may be
constitutionally forfeited when it is used to facilitate criminal ends, even though the owner
did not know that it was to be put to such use), with Degen, 116 S. Ct. at 1781-82 (requiring
the opportunity for a hearing to contest a civil forfeiture), and James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. at 62 (according limited due process rights to preseizure notice and a
hearing). These decisions lead to the inevitable conclusion that Justice Stevens should
have focused his dissent on a full due process challenge to existing civil forfeiture prece-
dent by relying on the guilty property fiction.
248. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Calero-Toledo de-
cision suggested two innocent owner defenses in the context of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
689 (1974). The majority in Calero-Toledo asserted that it would be difficult to ignore the
constitutional claim of an owner whose forfeited property was stolen or used without the
owner's consent. See id. Furthermore, the Court in Calero-Toledo explained that an
owner who proved that she took reasonable steps to prevent the illicit use of her property
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fused to extend Calero-Toledo or Austin to immunize blameless owners
from government seizures 49 Consequently, the majority opinion likely
will further the expansion of broad state and federal forfeiture laws250 and
generate needless confusion among attorneys defending their client's
property interests against seemingly omnipotent government powers.2 5'
In addition, the continued expansion of forfeiture laws may cause greater
harm to lienholders, mortgagees, financial institutions, retailers, and in-
surance companies because these parties, notwithstanding their inno-
252
cence, may forfeit their security interests in the property. Perhaps the
may be exempt from civil forfeiture. See id. at 689-90. In Austin, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment protects criminal defendants from excessive fines in civil forfeiture
proceedings. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). Many commentators
expressed surprise that the Court refused to apply Austin to innocent owners in the Bennis
decision because, to many, forfeiting an innocent owner's property seemed to be the ulti-
mate excessive fine. See Ingram, supra note 212, at 307 (maintaining that, by holding that
civil forfeitures of innocent owners' property was a form of punishment, the Bennis Court
would have honored the Austin Court's extensive inquiry into forfeiture jurisprudence");
Savage, supra note 13, at Al (characterizing the Bennis decision as "a surprising victory
for the broad use of a state's forfeiture power"). However, many lower courts considered
applying Austin and Calero-Toledo to innocent owners, but declined to do so until given
further guidance by the Supreme Court. See State v. Gaudio, 562 A.2d 1156, 1158 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1989) (noting the absence of any cases subsequent to Calero-Toledo in which the
innocent owner defense was applied).
249. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (explaining the Court's intention to continue to ad-
here to the guilty property fiction from The Palmyra line of cases); see also Will, supra
note 40, at C7 (criticizing the Court's strict adherence to The Palmyra decision and its in-
ability to assess the need for change in Due Process rights for innocent owners).
250. See Richard Carelli, Court Backs Car Seizure in Michigan: Wife Co-Owned Vehi-
cle Used With Prostitute, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1996, at 3; Spiros A. Tsimbinos, U.S.
Supreme Court Expands Government Forfeiture Rights, N.Y. CRIM. L. NEWS, Mar. 1996,
at 3, 3 (describing Bennis as a "boost for local, state and federal prosecutors who see the
forfeiture laws as an aggressive crime-fighting tool"); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-
Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 143 (cautioning that the Bennis decision may result in
forfeiture laws harming property owners when parties such as common carriers and
commercial lessees commit wrongs triggering a forfeiture of the bailor's or lessor's
property). Surprisingly, some commentators have argued that the Bennis decision actually
may inspire legislators to enact innocent owner defenses in response to the public outcry
over Mrs. Bennis's loss. See Cupp, supra note 224, at 602 ("Bennis may have the effect of
prompting legislatures to enact innocent owner defenses along with civil forfeiture
statutes."); Significant Ruling For Asset Forfeiture, PROSECUTOR, May-June 1996 at 31, 31
(quoting one federal official with the Justice Department who commented that Bennis
may have made it "more difficult to get legislation favorable to asset forfeiture passed").
251. Cf Tsimbinos, supra note 250, at 3 ("The majority opinion also appears to have
halted the trend in the High Court to restrict what many have seen as over-zealous forfei-
ture procedures."). Tsimbinos comments that civil forfeiture proceedings have become so
common over the last several years that practitioners must diligently keep abreast of de-
veloping trends to best represent their clients. See id. at 4.
252. See Jeri Poller, Government Forfeiture of Collateral. Mortgagees and the Innocent
Lien Holder Defense, 112 BANKING L.J. 534, 540-41 (1995) (discussing the difficulties that
co-titleholding spouses and mortgagees may have in maintaining an innocent owner de-
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most disturbing aspect of the majority's holding, however, is that Bennis
apparently stands for the proposition that seizure of even prized posses-
sions may be unavoidable, in certain circumstances, despite an owner's
"best efforts" to contain her conduct, or the conduct of others, within the
limits of the law.253
Furthermore, the Bennis decision may encourage law enforcement to
interpret forfeiture laws broadly in order to encompass even more prop-
erty within the reach of the law and, consequently, fill department coffers
with the proceeds of seized property.254 The Bennis decision provides in-
nocent owners little relief from arbitrary government seizures, cloaked in
fense under state and federal forfeiture laws); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading
Cases, supra note 1, at 143 (explaining that while civil forfeiture theoretically places the
costs of criminal conduct on the shoulders of those best-equipped to prevent it, in reality,
certain classes of owners are unable to detect or prevent such abuse); see also Joseph F.
Savage, Jr. & Stephanie A. Martz, How Corporations Spell Relief: Substituting Civil Sanc-
tions for Criminal Prosecution, 11 CRIM. JUST. 10, 10 (1996) (warning that corporations
are vulnerable to civil forfeiture proceedings under the federal mail and wire fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1345). The domestic and international banking industry is particularly suscep-
tible to civil forfeiture enforcement proceedings because criminal defendants often laun-
der money through the bank's otherwise untainted accounts, thus exposing all monies in
the accounts to forfeiture. See Kirk W. Munroe, Surviving the Solution: The Extraterrito-
rial Reach of the United States, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 505, 515-16 (1996) (describing the diffi-
culties that both domestic and foreign banks experience in attempting to prevent illegal
use of their accounts and potential forfeiture proceedings); William J. Snider, International
Cooperation in the Forfeiture of Illegal Drug Proceeds, 6 CRIM. L.F. 377, 381-82 (1995)
(reporting on international agreements under which foreign countries and the United
States will honor the forfeiture decisions of foreign courts for property physically present
in another country).
253. Cf Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[i]f anything,
[Mrs. Bennis] was a victim"). Furthermore, if Mrs. Bennis had discovered her husband's
exploits and had attempted to stop him, Chief Justice Rehnquist's strict reading of Calero-
Toledo would not afford her a defense even if she took reasonable steps to prevent his
criminal use of the car. See id. at 999 (rejecting the "best efforts" defense). But see
Seamon, supra note 176, at 393-94 (arguing that civil forfeiture laws impose strict liability
and express a legislative judgment that public health and safety is more important than
protecting the rights of an individual property owner); Ward, supra note 4, at 118 (ex-
plaining that any harm caused to inculpable owners is secondary to the achievement of
Michigan's policy goals served by the statute because "swift and certain punishment deters
crime").
254. See HYDE, supra note 1, at 8-9 (explaining the conflict of interest created when
law enforcement officers view forfeiture proceedings as a revenue source); LEVY, supra
note 2, at 118-60 (describing law enforcement's seemingly unrestrained pursuit of forfei-
ture property and the liberal fiscal limitations on how the seized assets are spent); Ward,
supra note 4, at 11f (noting that since Wayne County, Michigan commenced the enforce-
ment initiative that yielded Mr. Bennis's arrest, the county has seized over 13,450 vehicles
totaling "almost $5.3 million for enhanced law enforcement"). Some authors have pub-
lished instructional manuals or books to educate law enforcement personnel to maximize
department forfeiture revenues. See FALCON, supra note 14, at 1-14; GOLDSMITH, supra
note 14, at 1-10.
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crime-fighting objectives, which the government may employ to obtain
financial windfalls for local police departments. 5 Moreover, any federal
legislation calling for forfeiture reforms will have little impact on the in-
nocent owner defense because civil forfeiture statutes often are
grounded in state police powers, an area traditionally beyond Congress's
256
reach. Thus, the Bennis decision effectively limits federal control over
the enforcement of state forfeiture laws because the Supreme Court has
refused to extend constitutional due process protection to innocent own-
257
ers who lose their property under state forfeiture statutes. Ultimately,
state law enforcement, police, and revenue-hungry state legislatures are
left to interpret the Bennis decision to their advantage. 8
255. See Jacob M. Hilton, Note, Keep Him on a Short Leash: Innocence of Owner Not
a Constitutional Defense to Forfeiture of Property Allegedly Connected to Illegal Conduct:
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 153-56 (1997) (sur-
mising that Bennis gives law enforcement personnel the "green light" to fight for greater
department revenue through increased numbers of forfeitures); Aaron Epstein, High
Court Affirms Seizure Laws: Critics Say Ruling Will Penalize Many Property Owners Un-
fairly, DAILY NEWS (LOS ANGELES), Mar. 5, 1996, at N9 (arguing that Bennis provides
individuals with little protection from the "flagrant abuses" of law enforcement seizure
powers that also compelled Congress to draft forfeiture reform proposals); see also HYDE,
supra note 1, at 11-15 (reviewing cases in which law enforcement personnel in pursuit of
department revenues improperly seized innocent owners' property, often with scant evi-
dence of criminal activity); Carelli, supra note 250, at 3 (arguing that the "ruling could
make some prosecutors more aggressive in seeking to enforce forfeiture laws as a crime-
fighting tool").
256. See HYDE, supra note 1, at 75, 79-80 (advocating federal forfeiture reforms); Lin-
net Myers, Forfeiture Laws: Fair or Foul? Americans Not Guilty of Crimes Decry Loss of
Property, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1996, at 6 (summarizing federal asset forfeiture reform leg-
islation, but explaining that federal reforms would not have helped Mrs. Bennis because
Michigan seized her property under a state nuisance law). Congressman Hyde recently
introduced a proposed amendment to the federal asset forfeiture laws. See H.R. 1916,
104th Cong. (1995). This bill would shift the burden of proof in federal forfeiture pro-
ceedings from the property owner to the government and provide owners with a "best ef-
forts" defense. See id. While this bill would not have helped Mrs. Bennis's challenge to
Michigan's nuisance abatement law, the proposed legislation would provide greater pro-
tection for owners whose property is seized under the notorious Comprehensive Drug
Prevention and Crime Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994); see also supra note 242 (recit-
ing the text of H.R. 1916).
257. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. 1003 (Thomas J., concurring) (stating that it is not the role
of the United States Supreme Court to impose constitutional limits on state civil forfeiture
statutes). However, some state courts have extended due process protection to innocent
owners under their state constitution. See State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 112 (Alaska 1981).
258. See Savage, supra note 13, at A12 ("Nonetheless, the ruling leaves the matter in
the hands of local prosecutors and state lawmakers, many of whom have supported ag-
gressive efforts to seize property that is linked to criminal activity."). Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion states that broad forfeiture laws, though undesirable, are not unconsti-
tutional, further inviting legislatures to tailor forfeiture laws to satisfy growing fiscal re-
quirements. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct at 1001-02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Finally, the Bennis decision may increase confusion among lower
courts attempting to decipher the majority's enigmatic posture with re-
spect to whether a truly innocent owner defense exists."' While the ma-
jority and concurring Justices deferred to the trial courts' remedial dis-
cretionary powers to monitor unfair forfeitures, they failed to furnish
lower courts with any guidance as to how the courts should exercise their
discretion."6 Moreover, in light of Bennis, if a trial court wants to afford
an individual an innocent owner defense, the court must first determine
whether the owner expressly or implicitly "consented" to the wrong-
doer's use of her property.26" ' For example, the Bennis Court ruled that
Mrs. Bennis's status as a co-title holder constituted consent for her hus-
259. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that J.W. Gold-
smith and Calero-Toledo expressly reserved the question as to whether stolen property or
property used without an owner's consent could be subject to civil forfeiture. See id
Again, however, the Court failed to explain whether, at a minimum, unconsenting owners
could be considered "truly innocent owners," and thereby excluded from the reach of for-
feiture provisions under the Due Process Clause. See id. One lower court, for example,
has argued that the majority opinion may have created a limited innocent owner defense
for certain classes of claimants, but held that the plaintiff "ha[d] not alleged facts sufficient
to establish his eligibility for the innocent owner defense as defined in Bennis." United
States v. Eighty-Three Thousand, One Hundred and Thirty-Two Dollars, No. 95-CV-2844,
1996 WL 599725, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1996). However, when considering what facts
the claimant must allege in order to sustain an innocence defense, the Court may have
concluded erroneously that because the wrongdoer did not steal the seized property from
the claimant, the claimant was not entitled to an innocent owner defense. Compare id.
("[T]he [Bennis] majority [argued] that any constitutional innocent owner de-
fense ... exists, if at all, only where property was stolen from its owner before the right to
forfeiture attached." (emphasis added)), with Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5 ("The Gold-
smith-Grant Court expressly reserved opinion 'as to whether the section can be extended
to property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or con-
sent.' "(emphases added)).
260. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg opined
that Michigan courts stood ready to police inequitable government seizures, but failed to
articulate guidelines for trial courts to use in exercising those equitable powers. See id.
The majority opinion also failed to set forth a standard that appellate courts could apply to
determine when a trial court abused its discretion in ordering a forfeiture. See id. at 1009
n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Michigan Supreme Court "did not even men-
tion the relevance of innocence to the trial court's exercise of its 'equitable discretion"').
261. Cf Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5 (asserting that because John Bennis co-owned the
forfeited automobile, Mrs. Bennis could not claim that the car was used without her con-
sent, and thus she was not entitled to an innocent owner defense); LEVY, supra note 2, at
161-66 (discussing the difficulty of applying the various "knowledge" or "consent" provi-
sions in judicially and legislatively created innocent owner defenses). State courts have
cited Bennis when interpreting the language of innocence defenses in state statutes and
have struggled with the same issues concerning what level of knowledge or consent is re-
quired under the statute. See In re One 1986 Pontiac Firebird, 687 A.2d '190, 191 (Del.
1997) (citing Bennis in determining whether statutory innocence defense should be ex-
tended to co-owners under state law).
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band's use of the family car.262 Therefore, assuming the majority would
extend an innocent owner defense only to unconsenting defendants, un-
der the majority's rationale, certain classes of property owners, including
parents, siblings, and employers, would be subject to government seizure
laws due to the wrongful conduct of their children, siblings, or employ-
ees. Regrettably, given the Court's past civil forfeiture decisions, the
lower courts are unlikely to resolve this dilemma in favor of innocent
264
owners' property rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bennis v. Michigan marks a return to the absolute liability decisions of
the early nineteenth century. By failing to recognize the need for a judi-
cially created innocent owner defense, the Bennis majority ignored the
reality of increasingly broad civil forfeiture laws and overzealous law en-
forcement practices. In addition, by refusing to apply the Excessive
Fines Clause to innocent owners, the Court effectively conferred greater
protection from civil forfeiture upon criminal defendants than blameless
property owners. The Bennis decision will likely spawn further expan-
sion of broad state and federal forfeiture laws as legislatures increase
their efforts to curb crime and help fund law enforcement with the val-
ued proceeds derived from the sale of seized property. Because Bennis
failed to articulate a judicially created innocent owner defense for indi-
262. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
263. See id. This conclusion is disturbing for those property owners who are deemed
by law to have given implicit consent for another to use their property. Cf HYDE, supra
note 1, at 7 ("Think what this could mean to you: your teenager is allowed to use the fam-
ily car and a 'roach' discarded in an ashtray by one of his passengers could cost you your
car."). Even under a broad reading of the majority opinion, these special classes of prop-
erty owners could assert an innocence defense only if they were able to prove that the
wrongdoer did not occupy a special relationship with them, and, therefore, that the
wrongdoer used the property without the owner's consent. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999
n.5.
264. Recently, one federal court followed Bennis, when it rejected an owner's inno-
cence defense to the confiscation of a substantial sum of his money when he entrusted the
money to a third party with directions to deliver it to the owner's mother in the Dominican
Republic. See Eighty-Three Thousand, One Hundred and Thirty-Two Dollars, 1996 WL
599725, at *3. Thus far, however, most other lower court decisions have cited Bennis for
principles other than that civil forfeitures do not implicate innocent owners' constitutional
rights. See St. Peter v. United States, No. CIV. A. 96-11043-ADM, 1996 WL 461625, at *3
(D. Mass. July 24, 1996) (citing Bennis for the proposition that civil forfeiture statutes ad-
vance certain nonpunitive goals that "include encouraging property owners to take care in
managing their property so that it will not be used for illegal purposes"); State v. Mathies,
C.A. No. 17591, 1996 WL 527196, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App, Sept. 18, 1996) (citing Bennis for
the proposition that "in property forfeiture context, the goal of deterrence is not necessar-
ily punitive").
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viduals whose property is used without their consent, lower courts have
little guidance for future decision making. Inculpable property owners:
Beware.
